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THE  enigmatic behavior of the U.S. economy during the 1980 recession 
makes it more imperative than ever that some of the mystery that sur- 
rounds inventory behavior be solved. On the surface, the economy seems 
to have reacted quite differently to what appear to be rather similar exter- 
nal shocks (principally, rapid increases in oil prices)  in 1973-75  and in 
1979-80.  However, if one abstracts from inventory behavior and focuses 
on final sales, the two recessions look rather similar. Several observations 
confirm this. First, the briefest recession in U.S. history was also the first 
in which inventory investment did not swing sharply toward liquidation 
between the peak and the trough. Second, if one judges the contraction 
by real final sales instead of real GNP, the 1980 recession was actually 
far deeper than the "severe" 1973-75  recession.1 And third, the way the 
1980 recession was concentrated into a single quarter seems less unusual 
if one looks at real final sales instead of real GNP. In the 1973-75  reces- 
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1. Real GNP declined $60.7 billion from peak to trough in the 1973-75 reces- 
sion, versus  only $38.6 billion in the 1980 recession.  However, the respective  declines 
in real final  sales were $22.7 billion and $40.8 billion. 
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sion, for example, fully 90 percent of the total peak-to-trough decline in 
real final sales happened in a single quarter (1974:4). 
In a word, inventories hold the key to understanding why the  1980 
recession was so different from previous ones. 
Relative  to its importance in business fluctuations, inventory invest- 
ment must be the most underresearched aspect of  macroeconomic  ac- 
tivity. A hot topic in the  1950s, research on inventory behavior appar- 
ently went  out  of  style in the  early  1960s  and languished during the 
1970s. But there was never any good reason for work on inventories to 
fall out of fashion. The importance of inventory movements in business 
cycles did not end in the early 1960s. Nor, despite Michael Lovell's best 
efforts, did economists develop such a well established and empirically 
validated theory of inventory investment that the case was closed.2 Yet 
research on inventories went out like high-buttoned shoes. 
Worse yet, what little attention the profession has paid to inventories 
over the past two decades seems to have been misplaced. Both theoretical 
and empirical attention appears to have congealed around applying the 
production smoothing-buffer stock model to the study of manufacturers' 
inventories of finished goods. Yet, as I demonstrate below, finished goods 
held by manufacturers constitute one of the least important types of in- 
ventory. Furthermore, I argue that the underlying theoretical framework 
is probably inappropriate and inconsistent with the facts. Obviously this 
leaves both the microeconomics  and macroeconomics  of  inventory be- 
havior in a rather unsatisfactory state. 
The structure of this paper naturally follows  from the preceding re- 
marks. First, some basic facts of inventory fluctuations in the U.S. econ- 
omy are set out. This preliminary investigation  (as  well  as data avail- 
ability) leads me to concentrate on retail inventories instead of manufac- 
turers' inventories  of  finished goods.  Second,  a  variety  of  competing 
theories are examined in order to see which, if any, make sense in the 
light of the facts. Third, an alternative model of retail inventory invest- 
ment is  developed  and compared with  the  traditional theory.  Finally, 
empirical inventory equations are derived from this theory,  and these 
equations are estimated econometrically and used to study recent inven- 
tory behavior. 
2.  Michael Lovell,  "Manufacturers'  Inventories, Sales Expectations, and the 
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The Importance of Inventories in Business Cycles 
The overwhelming importance of  inventory movements in  business 
cycles is one of those basic facts that seems to be inadequately appreci- 
ated. Inventory investment is,  on  average, a tiny  component  of  GNP 
(about 1 percent).  Yet it has almost always accounted for a major share 
of  the decline in GNP  during recessions-and  has often  exceeded  the 
decline in GNP as a whole, that is, real final sales have often risen during 
recessions. 
INVENTORIES  IN  RECESSIONS 
The top part of table 1 shows the relevant data for the seven postwar 
recessions. Inventory change has, on average, accounted for 101 percent 
of the peak to trough decline in real GNP; or, keeping score a different 
way, the average inventory change was 60 percent of the average GNP 
decline.3 
This pattern is not new. The bottom part of the table displays similar 
data for the interwar period and tells a similar story. In fact, real GNP 
actually increased from peak to trough in two of the five interwar reces- 
sions. Inventory investment, however, always declined. 
The 1980 recession stands out as a sharp break with history. With the 
exception of the post-World War II adjustment period, during which in- 
ventories were replenished while production fell,  the  1980  recession is 
the only one  since World War I  (and  perhaps the only  one  since the 
American  revolution)  in  which  inventory investment moved  counter- 
cyclically. Some possible reasons for this are explored at the end of the 
paper. 
DECOMPOSITION  OF  VARIANCE 
Recessions are obviously atypical periods, almost by definition. It is 
clear that inventories play a rather minor role in economic activity when 
3. Note that the peaks and troughs are defined here by real GNP. They do not 
always correspond  to official NBER dates. One common objection to data like those 
in table 1 is that other components of GNP might show a similarly dramatic pat- 
tern. They do not. In fact, the only component that comes close is fixed investment, 
which has been procyclical in all seven recessions. A  table like table 1 for fixed 
investment  would have entries in the third column ranging  from a high of 95 percent 
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Table 1. Changes  in GNP and  in Inventory  Investment  in Recessions 
Change in inven- 
tory investment 
Change in  as a percentage 
Change in  inventory  of change in 
Period  real GNPa  investmenta  real GNP 
Postwar recessions (peak and trough)b 
1948:4-1949:4  -7.1  -13.0  183 
1953:2-1954:2  -20.2  -9.2  46 
1957:3-1958:1  -23.0  -10.5  46 
1960:1-1960:4  -8.6  -18.0  209 
1969:3-1970:4  -7.3  -12.3  168 
1973:4-1975:1  -60.7  -38.0  63 
1980:1-1980:2  -38.6  2.2  -6 
Interwar recessions 
1920-21  -3.6  -4.2  117 
1923-24  1.5  -3.7 
1926-27  1.0  -0.8 
1929-32  -32.0  -5.6  18 
1937-38  -3.1  -2.9  94 
Source: Postwar data are from the national income and product accounts; interwar  data are adapted from 
Moses Abramovitz, In  ventories  and  Business Cycles  (National Bureau  of Economic Research, 1950), table 84, 
pp. 476-77. 
a.  Billions of 1972 dollars for postwar recessions, billions of 1929 dollars for interwar recessions. 
b.  Peaks and troughs of real GNP, not official dates of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
c.  Real GNP rose during this recession. 
the economy is expanding smoothly. A broader picture can be obtained 
of the importance of inventories in business fluctuations as follows. De- 
fine Yt as real GNP, Xt  as real final sales, and Nt as real inventory stock 
at the beginning of the period. Then the GNP identity is 
(1)  Yt =  Xt  +  (Nt+i  -  Nt). 
If all data are detrended and lowercase symbols are used to denote de- 
viations from trend, the variance of GNP around trend for the 1947:2- 
1981:1 period can be decomposed as4 
(2)  var(y) =  var(x) +  var(A\n)  +  2 cov(x, A\n). 
(678.3)  (514.4)  (43.9)  (116.1) 
4.  Because of a strong a priori notion (based on observations of plotted data) 
that there was a break in the trend of most macro aggregates after the first OPEC 
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Judging from equation 2, inventory fluctuations account for only 6.5 
percent of GNP fluctuations about trend (but recall that inventory invest- 
ment averages only about 1 percent of GNP).  However, this calculation 
of  the  importance  of  inventories  may  understate their  relevance  for 
changes in GNP because there is a strong positive  covariance between 
deviations of real final sales and real inventory investment from trend 
(the simple correlation is 0.38),  and because quarterly deviations from 
trend are likely to be persistent. An alternative decomposition, which may 
be more sensitive to the importance of inventories for changes in output, 
can be obtained by taking the first difference of equation 1 and decompos- 
ing the variance of the growth of GNP for the same period as 
(3)  var(A\  Y) =  var(A\X)  +  var(A\2N)  +  2 cov(A\X,  A\2N). 
(111.5)  (85.3)  (33.1)  (-6.9) 
If one looks at equation 3, inventory fluctuations appear to account for 
a full 30 percent of the fluctuations in the growth of real GNP from quar- 
ter to quarter. This is an enormous amount for such a small component. 
Changes in final sales, however, are negatively correlated with changes in 
inventory investment, so that the direct contribution of inventory fluc- 
tuations may slightly overstate their importance. 
A more disaggregated look at the variance of y (or of AY) offers some 
lessons about the history of business fluctuations in the postwar United 
States. Tables 2 and 3 display disaggregated versions of equations 2 and 3 
in which the final sales variable is  divided into  its  main components: 
consumption expenditures, fixed investment, government purchases, and 
net exports. In  each  table,  variances are reported in boldface  on  the 
diagonal, covariances above  the  diagonal,  and  correlation coefficients 
below it. These tables contain some fascinating facts. 
detrended  according  to the following model of the trend component: 
log Zt =  ao +  ajTIME  +  a2D TIME  +  et, 
where TIME  is a linear time trend and DTIME  is a linear time trend beginning at I 
in  1973:4 in  quarterly data or  October 1973  in  monthly data. Estimation was 
by generalized least squares, allowing for second-order autocorrelation in  -t. The 
antilogs of the fitted values from the detrending regressions were subtracted from 
the actual data to define the detrended  data. Because the detrending  of each series 
was done in logs independently,  the identity (equation 1)  does not hold exactly 
for the detrended  data; but it comes close. 448  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  2:1981 
Table 2.  Decomposition of the Variance of GNP  around Trend, 
1947:2  through 1981:1a 
Inven-  Con- 
tory  sumption  Fixed  Govern- 
invest-  expendi-  invest-  ment  Net 
GNP  ment  ture  ment  purchases  exports 
GNP  678.3  99.1  233.2  206.0  198.9  -66.4 
Inventory investment  0.58  43.9  34.7  37.5  -3.5  -10.7 
Consumption  expenditure  0.64  0.37  199.1  112.2  -139.4  12.2 
Fixed investment  0.79  0.56  0.79  101.4  -36.8  -12.8 
Government  purchases  0.33  -0.02  -0.41  -0.16  550.0  -140.5 
Net exports  -0.30  -0.19  0.10  -0.15  -0.70  74.2 
Source: Author's calculations based on national income and product accounts. 
a.  Variances  are displayed on the diagonal; covariances and correlation coefficients  are shown above and 
below the diagonal, respectively. 
Table 3.  Decomposition of the Variance of Changes in GNP,  1947:3  through 1981:1 
Alnven-  ACon- 
tory  sumption  AFixed  AGovern-  ANet 
invest-  expendi-  invest-  ment  ex- 
AGNP  ment  ture  ment  purchases  ports 
AGNP  111.5  29.6  43.2  32.9  5.3  0.5 
Alnventory  investment  0.49  33.1  -2.4  4.4  -1.9  -3.4 
AConsumption  expenditure  0.71  -0.07  32.9  15.9  -1.5  -1.7 
AFixed investment  0.76  0.19  0.68  16.7  -2.2  -1.9 
AGovernment  purchases  0.15  -0.10  -0.08  -0.17  10.6  0.3 
ANet exports  0.02  -0.22  -0.11  -0.17  0.04  7.1 
Source: Author's calculations based on national income and product accounts. 
a.  See table 2, note a. 
Table 2 displays the decomposition  of var(y)-the  variance of  real 
GNP  about trend. The most striking fact, though it is tangential to the 
concerns of this paper, is how much of the variance of x is composed of 
the variance of government purchases. But compared with the variances 
about trend of  consumption and investment  (both  of  which are much 
larger components of GNP),  the variance of inventory investment does 
not look so paltry as it did in equation 2. Furthermore, a strong positive 
covariation is apparent between an  and either consumption or invest- 
ment. Thus inventory fluctuations are more significant than might appear 
from equation 2. 
Inventory investment seems even more important in table 3, which dis- 
aggregates equation  3.  Inventory investment has  the  largest variance, Alan  S. Blinder  449 
Table 4. Decomposition  of the Variance  of Inventories,  Quarterly,  1959-80 
Variance 
Inventory  Variance  of change 
level at  Percent  of inveni-  Percent  in inven-  Percenit 
Inventory  the end  of total  tory in-  of total  tory in-  of total 
component  of 1980a  level  vestmenitb variance  vestmentc  variance 
Total nonfarm  297.6  100.0  44.45  100.0  36.90  100.0 
Manufacturers  145.0  48.7  15.76  35.5  10.58  28.7 
Materials  and supplies  51.0  17.1  5.28  11.9  5.70  15.4 
Work in progress  50.4  16.9  3.87  8.7  2.99  8.1 
Finished goods  43.5  14.6  2.10  4.7  2.40  6.5 
Retail trade  64.6  21.7  9.07  20.4  14.56  39.5 
Automobiles  15.3  5.1  4.57  10.3  9.91  26.9 
Wholesale  trade  64.7  21.7  3.39  7.6  4.77  12.9 
All other  23.4  7.9  1.22  2.7  1.82  4.9 
All covariance  terms  ...  ...  15.01  33.8  5.17  14.0 
Source: Author's calculations based on national income and product accounts. 
a.  In billions of 1972 dollars, seasonally adjusted. 
b.  From 1959:2 through 1980:4. 
c.  From 1959:3 through 1980:4. 
measured in quarter-to-quarter  changes, of any GNP component, which 
is quite surprising  when one recalls that, on average, consumption spend- 
ing is about seventy times as large as inventory investment. The case is 
probably made; inventories really do matter in business fluctuations. 
INVENTORY  FLUCTUATIONS  BY  TYPE 
A natural next question to ask is, which sorts of inventories are respon- 
sible for all this fluctuation? From 1959 on there are good data on real 
inventories by sector and by stage of processing. Table 4 reports a de- 
composition of the overall variance of both nonfarm inventory invest- 
ment (AN)  and the change in nonfarm inventory investment (A2N).  Two 
results are striking. First, manufacturers' inventories of finished goods, 
the component of inventories that has received the lion's share of both 
theoretical and empirical attention, are the least important type of inven- 
tories in  cyclical  fluctuations. Second,  retail inventories  are the  most 
important component of total inventories in terms of cyclical variability. 
Although less important than total manufacturing inventory investment 
in accounting for variations around trend, retail inventory investment is 
far more important than any of the three components of manufacturers' 
inventories. And when it comes to the variance of changes in inventory 450  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1981 
investment, retail inventories are more important than even total manu- 
facturing inventories.5 
THE  INVENTORY-SALES  RATIO  AS  A  CYCLICAL  INDICATOR 
The most  commonly  used  indicator of  the  state of  inventory equi- 
librium or disequilibrium is the ratio of inventories to sales in manufac- 
turing and trade. This ratio moves countercyclically, rising in recessions. 
But the meaning of this empirical regularity is far from clear. 
Letting N* denote desired inventories, the ratio can be expressed as 
N  N  N* 
X  N*  X 
In most journalistic interpretations of  the business cycle,  N*/X  is  re- 
garded as relatively constant, and observed fluctuations in N/X  are taken 
to reflect changes in inventories relative to desired inventories, that is, 
inventory disequilibrium. In this view, N/N*  rises in recessions because 
firms accumulate unwanted stocks and falls in booms because sales out- 
strip expectations and stocks are drawn down. 
An  opposing  interpretation is  that N/N*  is  always  approximately 
unity, with firms always keeping their inventories more or less where they 
want them. In this view, it is N*/X  that rises in recessions and falls in 
booms.  Why? Suppose desired inventories depend on long-run average 
sales, X*, and N*/X*  is constant. Then, in a recession, X falls relative to 
X*,  so N*/X  rises. For similar reasons, N*/X  falls in a boom. Move- 
ments in N/X,  in this view,  do  not  indicate inventory disequilibrium. 
These different interpretations of the same basic fact lead to strikingly 
different specifications and interpretations of econometric equations ex- 
plaining inventory investment, and these are explored below. 
The Production Smoothing-Buffer Stock Model of Inventory Behavior 
Firms hold  inventories for  transactions, speculative,  or  precaution- 
ary reasons. A  clothing store must display goods  on  the racks to  sell 
them; a furniture store needs  floor samples to  show  customers  (both 
5. However, a good deal of the variability  of retail inventory investment comes 
from the automobile industry, where the distinction between retail inventories and 
manufacturers'  inventories  of finished goods may not be very sharp. Alan S. Blinder  451 
transactions motives).  Manufacturers may hold stocks of raw materials 
because they think their prices will rise (speculative motives).  A depart- 
ment store holds inventories to avoid running out of stock and therefore 
losing customers (a precautionary motive).  There are other motives as 
well. For example, manufacturers may hold inventories of finished goods 
because they want to smooth production in the face of fluctuating sales. 
Manufacturers  may find inventories of work in progress useful in schedul- 
ing production. 
Although it is easy to invent micro theoretic rationales for holding in- 
ventories, only one model has provided the micro foundations for any 
substantial amount of  empirical work.  That  model  is  the  production 
smoothing-buffer stock model,  which was first extensively used in em- 
pirical work by Lovell and has provided the basis for most empirical work 
since then.6 
Production smoothing arises when  sales are variable over time and 
marginal costs of production are rising; it has nothing inherently to do 
with uncertainty. Even without randomness anywhere, firms with vari- 
able sales and rising marginal costs will find it optimal to smooth pro- 
duction relative to sales, accumulating inventories when demand is weak 
and liquidating inventories when demand is strong. In addition to being 
variable, sales may also be random. In this case a buffer-stock element 
arises: firms may hold inventories against the contingency that demand 
will be unexpectedly high. 
The production smoothing-buffer stock model is typically represented 
empirically by the following stock-adjustment equation: 
(4)  Nt+1  -  Nt = X(Nt*  -  Nt) -  (Xt -  Xte)  +  Et, 
where Xt is expected sales and Et is a random error. That the first term 
represents the production-smoothing motive while the second represents 
the buffer stock can be seen by using the identity (equation 1 ) to rewrite 
4 as 
(5)  yt  =  Xte  +  (1  -_f)(Xt-  Xt) +  X(N* -  Nt) + Et. 
The first two terms reflect the use of inventories as a buffer stock. If 
production  decisions  are  made  before  actual  sales  are  known  and 
Nt  =  N*,  firms will produce Xte.  Under these circumstances, ,B will be 
6.  Lovell, "Manufacturers'  Inventories." 452  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1981 
unity; inventory movements will completely buffer production from sales 
surprises. If, however, firms desire and are able to alter production plans 
within the period as they learn about Xt, /3 can be less than unity. In the 
extreme case, /3 = 0, production reacts fully to realized sales, and inven- 
tories do not serve as a buffer at all. Thus the size of  /3 measures the 
degree of buffering. The value of ,B  obviously should depend, among other 
things, on the length of the observation period. 
The last term in 5 represents intended inventory accumulation, and 
production-smoothing considerations will result in a value of X between 
0 and 1, which is what leads to the stock-adjustment feature.7 
To make the model represented by equation 4 operational, N* is typi- 
cally expressed as a linear function of Xt or Xt or a related variable, and 
some proxy for expectations is introduced. When this is done, the follow- 
ing sorts of empirical results typically emerge from quarterly data.8 
First, the estimated coefficient P is practically zero. This means that 
sales surprises do not affect inventories, so that such surprises must have 
nearly one-for-one  effects on  output. That is, the estimated coefficient 
suggests that the buffer stock motive is unimportant. 
Second, the coefficient X is normally so small that it seems implausible 
to interpret it as a parameter measuring speed of adjustment. When even 
the biggest swings in inventories amount to  no more than one  or two 
weeks of sales, it is hard to understand why X  would be around 0.1 or 0.2, 
that is, why only  10 or 20 percent of the deviation of inventories from 
target would be corrected within a quarter.9 
A third piece of evidence, which is difficult to reconcile with the notion 
of production smoothing, is the observation that the variance of Y over 
time exceeds that of X  in a wide variety of sectors and subsectors, and 
also in the entire economy. 
Finally, as just shown, retail inventories play a more prominent role 
in cyclical fluctuations than manufacturers'  inventories of finished goods, 
for which the production smoothing-buffer stock model was designed. 
The stock-adjustment model can be applied to retailing, with empirical 
7.  See Alan S. Blinder, "Inventories and Sticky Prices: More on  the Micro- 
foundations  of Macroeconomics,"  American Economic Review, forthcoming. 
8. See Martin Feldstein and Alan Auerbach, "Inventory Behavior in Durable- 
Goods Manufacturing: The Target-Adjustment  Model," BPEA, 2:1976, pp. 351- 
96; and F. Owen Irvine, Jr., "Retail Inventory Investment and the Cost of Capital," 
American  Economic  Review,  vol.  71  (September  1981),  pp.  633-48. 
9.  This point was emphasized  by Feldstein and Auerbach. See ibid. Alan S. Blinder  453 
results that in general turn out to be quite similar to those for manufac- 
turing.10  The problem is that a persuasive rationale for partial inventory 
adjustment by retailers is lacking. The variable Yt for a retailer represents 
deliveries from manufacturers, and it seems unlikely that the typical re- 
tailer faces rising marginal costs of purchasing. In fact, because of quan- 
tity discounts and related phenomena, retailers probably face  constant 
or  declining  marginal costs.  Under  such  conditions,  the  production- 
smoothing model falls apart. Just as a manufacturer with declining mar- 
ginal costs will want to produce output in large lots (production runs),  a 
retailer with falling marginal costs will want to "bunch" orders to reduce 
costs. 
The S, s Model of Inventory Behavior 
This simple idea is the basis for the model I explore in this paper. In 
particular, suppose there are no quantity discounts but there is a substan- 
tial fixed cost of placing an order or receiving a delivery. That is, suppose 
a retailer's cost of acquiring Yt units from the manufacturer in period t 
is given  by 
(6)  C(Yt) =  A +  cYt  if  Yt > O 
Q Yt) =  O  if  Yt =  0, 
where A is fixed cost and c is (constant)  marginal cost. 
This cost function has been studied extensively in the operations re- 
search literature. It leads to an inventory strategy called the "S, s rule," 
meaning that inventories are allowed to dwindle to some minimum level, 
s, at which time a purchase restores inventories to their maximum level, S. 
The basic idea behind the S, s strategy is that, owing to the fixed costs, it 
pays for a firm to place fewer orders, make each order larger, and store 
more inventories than it would if fixed costs did not exist. 
There are many reasons for such a cost structure. Some originate with 
10. See Michael C. Lovell, "Department  Store Inventory, Sales, Order Relation- 
ships," in J. S. Duesenberry  and others,  eds.,  The  Brookings  Model:  Some  Furthler 
Results (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1969), pp. 18-38; and Irvine, "Retail Inven- 
tory Investment and the Cost of Capital," and "The Influence of Capital Costs on 
Inventory Investment: Time Series Evidence for a Department Store," Quarterly 
Review  of Economics  and Business,  forthcoming. 454  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1981 
the retailer. There may be transportation and warehousing costs that are 
lumpy  (for  example, it may cost  little more to  receive  a truckload of 
television sets than to receive a dozen).  Bookkeeping costs probably de- 
pend far more on the number of orders than on the quantity of goods 
ordered. Perhaps most important, and most often ignored, is the scarcity 
of managerial time and attention. One way to economize on this scarce 
resource is to place orders less frequently and make each one larger. 
Although  somewhat  contrary  to  standard  neoclassical  economic 
thought, this factor is probably pervasive and important. Why, for ex- 
ample, when workers take stationery from the office supply cabinet, do 
they not just take what they need for the next day (or hour or minute)? 
It is not because there is a large transportation cost or because there is 
bookkeeping to do. Rather, it is because each trip to the cabinet occupies 
some of the workers' time-valuable  time that they could spend on some- 
thing else. The same is certainly true for business managers.1" 
Other sources of fixed costs originate with manufacturers. They, too, 
may incur substantial costs in processing an order, getting the goods to- 
gether, and shipping them out. They certainly face the same scarcity of 
managerial time and energy that retailers do. These factors may induce 
the manufacturer to  adopt a pricing structure like  that represented in 
equation  6.  Indeed,  the  fact  that  most  manufacturers refuse  to  deal 
directly with consumers placing small orders suggests that the fixed costs, 
elusive as they may be, are probably very important in practice. Thus the 
cost technology  that underlies the S, s  model  is  appealing on  a priori 
grounds. The fixed cost, A, may represent a fee the manufacturer  charges, 
a cost the retailer incurs, or both. 
BACKGROUND 
The S, s model, which is allegedly in common use in industry, has a 
long and venerable history in the operations research and management 
science literature. The interest of economists in S, s inventory strategies 
seems to have been sparked by the pioneering paper of Arrow, Harris, 
and Marschak. Many articles on specific S, s models were published in 
the ensuing years, and Scarf finally proved that fixed costs of ordering 
11. Indeed, Michael Lovell suggests to me that part of the appeal of the S, s in- 
ventory strategy in practice is that, once the trigger points S and s are set, there is 
little need for managerial  attention  and decisionmaking. Alan S. Blinder  455 
make S, s rules of one type or another optimal under a wide variety of 
circumstances.12 
Because I make use of several examiples  of S, s models with particular 
simplifying assumptions, it is worth emphasizing that the basic S, s rule 
emerges as the optimal inventory strategy under a wide variety of assump- 
tions about such matters as what is random and what is deterministic, 
when information on sales becomes available to firms, whether it is pos- 
sible to accept unfilled orders, whether there are delivery lags, whether 
time is continuous or discrete, and so on. However, three features of the 
firm's economic environment seem to be critical to the optimality of the 
S, s rule. First, the cost of acquiring goods from the manufacturer must be 
precisely like that given in equation 6. It can be shown that this equation 
does in fact lead to the S, s rule, and also that such a rule will not be 
optimal if either A equals zero or c is not constant.13  Second, a firm's sales 
and prices must be exogenous. To my knowledge, no S, s models have 
been developed in which the firm can exercise control over its sales-for 
example, by varying its selling price. Furthermore, it is doubtful that S, s 
behavior is optimal once the probability distribution of sales comes under 
the firm's control  (even  though the fixed cost element will  continue to 
induce firms to order infrequently). Third, the parameters underlying the 
firm's optimization problem (its cost functions, probability distribution of 
sales, and so on)  must be constant through time. Every S, s model that I 
know about has been solved under the assumption of stationarity, includ- 
ing the assumption that sales are independently and identically distributed 
over time. Such assumptions are very stringent and empirically inaccu- 
rate. For example,  aggregate retail sales  are highly serially correlated, 
and it would be surprising indeed if this serial correlation disappeared at 
the level of the firm. 
12.  See  G.  Hadley  and T.  M.  Whitin,  Analysis  of  Inventory  Systems  (Prentice 
Hall, 1963); Kenneth J. Arrow, Theodore Harris, and Jacob Marschak, "Optimal 
Inventory Policy," Econometrica, vol.  19  (July  1951),  pp.  250-72;  Kenneth J. 
Arrow,  Samuel  Karlin,  and  Herbert  Scarf,  eds.,  Studies  in Applied  Probability  and 
Management Science (Stanford University Press, 1962);  K. J. Arrow, S. Karlin, 
and  H.  Scarf,  Stuidies in  the  Mathematical  Theory  of  Inventory  and  Production 
(Stanford University Press, 1958); and H. Scarf, "The Optimality  of  (S,s)  Policies 
in the Dynamic Inventory Problem,"  in K. J. Arrow, S. Karlin, and Patrick Suppes, 
eds., Mathematical  Methlods in the Social  Sciences,  1959  (Stanford  University  Press, 
1960),  pp.  196-202. 
13. An appendix showing this and other technical results is available from the 
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It is easy to see what happens qualitatively in a nonstationary environ- 
ment. It can be shown that if the underlying parameters vary over time, 
the firm will adhere to an St, st strategy in which the trigger points change 
each period.14  For example, if sales disturbances are serially correlated, 
information on past sales will be used in setting St and st for this period. 
AN  EXAMPLE 
To understand the factors determining S and s, it is helpful to have an 
example of an explicit solution. None  exists for the nonstationary case, 
which is the case of greatest empirical interest. Nonetheless,  a specific 
example will help clarify the nature of the S, s trigger points. Hadley and 
Whitin show that the following  square root rule is optimal or approxi- 
mately  optimal  in  a  variety  of  different models  in  which  firms have 
exogenous  (but random)  sales and minimize long-run costs in a station- 
ary environment:  15 
S-s  =  +d  [c  +  c q(s)] 
(7) 
S  -s  c 
1-H(s)  =  X  (r +  d), 
where 
X =  mean sales 
H(X)  =  cumulative distribution function of sales 
H(s)  =  the probability that sales will be less than s in a given period 
r =  real rate of interest 
d =  storage cost per period (as a percent) 
a=  a penalty cost for having an order unfilled per unit 
q(s) =  mean number of unfilled orders, which will depend on s and 
on H(X). 
Obviously, if the structure of cost or demand changes, so will S and s. 
14. This is demonstrated  in the appendix mentioned above, available from the 
author. See also David Easley and Daniel F. Spulber, "Optimal  Policies and Steady 
State Solutions for Inventory Problems with Markovian Uncertainty" (Brown Uni- 
versity, January 1979). 
15. In the Hadley-Whitin examples, firms that run out of  stock retain unfilled 
orders for the next period, though there is a penalty cost for doing so. See Hadley 
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The system of equations in 7 implicitly defines the trigger points S and 
s, and hence the width of the inventory range, as functions of the follow- 
ing parameters  with the following derivatives: 
S  =  S (r,d,,A  ,  H(X)) 
+  + 
(8)  s  =  s (r,d,,  ,  H(X)) 
+  + 
S-s  =  o(r,  d,-A,  H(X)). 
--+9?  + 
These derivatives have straightforward interpretations. If either interest 
costs or storage costs rise, firms reduce both S and s. But they change S 
more, so the optimal lot size, S -  s, falls. If the fixed cost of ordering rises 
relative to the marginal cost, firms reduce s and increase the optimal lot 
size; the effects on S are ambiguous. An increase in the penalty for run- 
ning out of stock causes both S and s to move up, but the effect on the lot 
size is indeterminant. Finally,  the  derivative with  respect to  H(X)  is 
heuristic notation to indicate that if the density function of sales shifts to 
the right, that is, if sales increase, firms raise both S and s and increase 
the optimal lot size. All these results make good intuitive sense. 
The empirical work reported in the next section is based on the notion 
that each of the exogenous variables listed in equation 8 influences the 
firm's choice of S and s. The rate of interest, r, the manufacturer's  price, c, 
and the distribution of sales, H(X),  are all captured by specific empirical 
variables. The fixed costs,  A,  and storage costs,  d,  are treated as un- 
observables. 
DYNAMIC  ADJUSTMENTS  BY  A  SINGLE  FIRM 
Suppose now that a firm has selected its trigger points, S and s. How 
will its inventories move through time? For simplicity, I assume that S 
and s are constant and an order placed within a period is received at the 
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Figure 1.  Dynamic Adjustment of Inventories by a Single Firma 
Inventory stock 
S 0N 
No  0  TX,,,  slope =-X 
slope  =-XO 
N2 =  S  X 
Qo  No-  XOX 
1  2 
Time 
a.  The  variables  N,  X,  and  Q denote  reat inventory  stock,  final  sales,  and  carry-over  stock,  respectively. 
Figure 1 traces the inventory holdings of a firm that starts with stock 
No at time t =  0, sells at the exogenously determined rate XO  for the first 
week  (between  t =  0 and t =  1),  and then sells at the rate X1 for the 
second week (between t =  1 and t =  2). 
Because inventories decline at the rate X except at the points at which 
a firm receives delivery, the rate of sales, XO,  is shown as the slope of the 
line emanating from point No. In this example, inventories fall below s, 
the lower trigger point, during period 1, so the firm places an order at the 
end of period 1 and a delivery is made replenishing the firm's stock so that 
it begins the next period with exactly S. Then inventories decline at rate 
X1 until the end of the second week (point N2 on the diagram). 
Consider how this firm's behavior would differ if its sales in the second 
week were better than those assumed in figure 1, that is, suppose the line 
emanating from point N1 were steeper. If it were only slightly steeper, N2 Alan S. Blinder  459 
would be lower than indicated in the figure. However, if it were substan- 
tially steeper, the firm would sell enough to justify placing an order dur- 
ing the second week, and so N2 would end up at S. In general one cannot 
determine whether stronger sales lead to higher or lower end-of-period 
inventories. This is an interesting finding. It contrasts sharply with the 
stock-adjustment model in which it is always true that higher sales lead 
to lower end-of-period inventories.16  It also shows that firms that appear 
to be quite similarly situated might nonetheless exhibit divergent behavior 
patterns. 
This example illustrates a general point:  the S, s model permits a far 
richer variety of dynamic behavior patterns than does the conventional 
stock-adjustment model. It may also help us to understand why inventory 
dynamics are so hard to predict. 
AGGREGATION  ACROSS  FIRMS 
If firms have a technology that makes the S, s rule optimal, aggregation 
across firms is inherently difficult.17  Indeed, it is precisely this difficulty 
that has prevented the S, s model from being used in empirical work to 
date. It is clear that the convenient fiction of the "representative firm" 
cannot be adopted because the essence of the S, s rule is (1 )  that firms 
that are otherwise identical will react very differently to the same demand 
shock if they have different initial inventories,  (2)  that firms may react 
very differently  to large demand shocks (which push inventories below s) 
than to small ones  (which do not induce them to place an order),  and 
(3)  that Yt is not a continuous function of Xt  for a single firm. Hence 
one must be extremely careful about aggregation. 
16. Strictly speaking, this statement is true only if Xt is an independently and 
identically  distributed  random variable. If not, a rise in sales might lead the firm to 
increase its desired inventory level. However, the same is true of the S, s model. If 
sales are serially correlated, "good" sales in the first week would lead the firm to 
raise S and s for the second week. Implicitly, figure 1 assumes that sales are inde- 
pendently and identically distributed. 
17. George A. Akerlof has recently applied the S, s model to aggregate money 
holdings in "Irving  Fischer on His Head: The Consequences  of Constant  Threshold- 
Target  Monitoring  of  Money  Holdings,"  Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics,  vol.  93 
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As a first step toward that aggregation, note that the S, s rule in discrete 
time can be expressed as follows  18 
If N,  -  X,>  s, then Yt =  0. 
If Nt  -  Xt <  s, then  Yt =  S +  Xt -  Nt. 
It is convenient to introduce the variable Qt =  Nt-  Xt.  This variable, 
sometimes called the "carry-over stock" in the inventory literature, is the 
inventory stock the firm has at the end of the period if it does not receive 
a delivery at that time.19 Using  this new variable, the S, s rule can be 
expressed more succinctly as 
If Qt >  s, then Yt =  0; 
(9) 
if Qt <  s, then  Yt =  S  -  Qt. 
Now consider an industry in which there are a large number of small 
firms with the same costs and technology that face the same random dis- 
tribution of demand shocks. All firms select the same s and S points. How- 
ever, during any particular period, each firm inherits a different initial 
inventory stock, Nt, and receives a different drawing, Xt, from the (com- 
mon)  sales distribution. Hence the composite variable, Qt  =  Nt-xt, 
differs across firms according to some density function, which itself varies 
over time as initial inventory stocks change. I  denote this function by 
tt(Qt). 
Using the notation Yt to denote the average of Yt across firms, I aver- 
age over the density of Qt. Then the S, s rule (equation 9)  implies 
(10)  Yt  k|  (S  -  Qt)ft(Qt)  dQ , 
S-Xi 
where X1  is  the  largest possible  realization  of  sales.  Integrating this 
equation by parts and simplifying yields 
(11)  Yt  =  (S  -  s)Ft(s)  +  -Xi  Ft(Qt)dQt, 
18. This formulation  assumes  either  that Xt is known at the start  of period  t or that 
there are no delivery  lags. If orders  must be placed before sales are known, Yt can 
only depend  on Xt, not on Xt. 
19. See figure 1 for an example of Q. Alan S. Blinder  461 
where Ft (Qt)  is the cumulative distribution function corresponding to 
density  ft(Qt). 
If mean sales are subtracted from both sides of  11, one has an equa- 
tion for inventory investment as a function of the distribution of  sales, 
the distribution of initial inventories as captured in the distribution across 
firms of  carry-over stock,  and the parameters S  and s,  which together 
indicate the desired inventory range. This inventory investment equation 
is quite different in spirit from the standard stock-adjustment specifica- 
tion. It is not only the means, but also the shapes, of the distributions of 
Xt  and Nt that determine the mean of  Yt. For example, for any given 
distribution of sales and mean level of initial inventories,  Yt  will be larger 
if the distribution of inventories has a concentration near s. 
The dynamics inherent in 11 are easy to explain but difficult to analyze. 
The distribution of inventories at the start of each period, coupled with 
the distribution of sales for the same period, together induce some dis- 
tribution  of  Qt  for that period.  Given  ft (Qt),  mean  deliveries  for period  t 
follow directly from 11 and mean inventory investment is simply F,  -X, 
The end-of-period inventory position of each firm is determined by the 
dynamics depicted in figure 1. The distribution of closing inventories for 
period t then becomes the distribution of opening inventories for period 
t +  1, and the problem repeats. 
IMPLICATIONS  AT  THE  INDUSTRY  LEVEL 
Equation 11 is hardly suitable for econometric implementation as it 
stands. It is highly nonlinear and includes variables whose values cannot 
be observed. My estimation strategy is first to linearize the equation and 
then to introduce observable proxies for  as many of  the unobservable 
variables as possible. This subsection explains how' the first step in this 
strategy is implemented. Most of the formal mathematics are relegated 
to appendix A; the text illustrates the dynamics of the inventory behavior 
for a firm and for an aggregation of firms using a simple numerical simu- 
lation model that, although a special case, does a better job of conveying 
the nature of the results. 
A Simulation Model.  Consider an economy  consisting of four firms 
with identical cost and demand structures, but whose ordering cycles are 
completely out of phase. Specifically, suppose each firm uses as trigger 
points S =  16 and s =  2 and, initially, sells four units every period. Table 462  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1981 
Table 5. Simulated  Steady-State  Inventory  Cycle for a Single Firma 
Initial  Carry-over  Inventory 
Period,  inventory,  Sales,  stock,  Deliveries,  investment, 
t  Nt  xt  Qt  Yt  Nt+1-Nt 
0  16  4  12  0  -4 
1  12  4  8  0  -4 
2  8  4  4  0  -4 
3  4  4  0  16  12 
4  16  4  12  0  -4 
5  12  4  8  0  -4 
6  8  4  4  0  -4 
7  4  4  0  16  12 
b 
Source: Simulations by the author. 
a.  The trigger points are S  =  16 and s  =  2. 
b.  Cycle repeats in subsequent periods. 
Table 6. Simulated  Steady State for a Four-Firm  Economy 
Initial  Inventory 
Period,  inventory,  Sales,  Deliveries,  investment,  Inventory- 
t  XYt-  Nt+1-Nt  sales ratio 
0  40  16  16  0  2.5 
1  40  16  16  0  2.5 
2  40  16  16  0  2.5 
3  40  16  16  0  2.5 
a 
Source: Simulations by the author. 
a.  All values are stable in subsequent periods. 
5 shows the steady-state inventory cycle of  one  such firm; each of  the 
others goes through the same ordering cycle, though with different timing. 
Say the economy consists of one firm that orders in periods 0, 4, 8,...; 
a second firm that orders in periods 1, 5, 9,  . . .;  a third that orders in 
periods 2, 6, 10, . . .; and a fourth ordering in periods 3, 7, 11,....  (as in 
table 5).  The aggregate economy then exhibits the steady-state behavior 
summarized in table 6. Inventory stocks are constant at 40, and deliveries 
(which match sales)  are 16 every period. Table 6 is an example of the 
steady state of equation 11. In the paragraphs below, I consider how the 
system adjusts if it is subjected to a variety of different shocks. 
Experiment 1: A Temporary Rise in Sales.  Suppose there is a purely 
transitory sales fluctuation that does not induce firms to change their ex- 
pectations  about future sales  or their target inventory range. Table  7 Alan S. Blinder  463 
Table 7. Effects  of a Temporary  Rise in Sales on a Single Firm 
Initial  Carry-over  Inventory 
Period,  inventory,  Sales,  stock,  Deliveries,  investment, 
t  Nt  xt  Qt  Yt  Nt+1-Nt 
0  16  6  10  0  -6 
1  10  4  6  0  -4 
2  6  4  2  14  10 
3  16  4  12  0  -4 
4  12  4  8  0  -4 
5  8  4  4  0  -4 
6  4  4  0  16  12 
7  16  4  12  0  -4 
a 
Source: Simulations by the author. 
a.  Cycle repeats in subsequent periods. 
shows the response of the firm in table 5 if sales are 6 in period 0 and then 
return to 4 thereafter. Inventories are drawn down more quickly than nor- 
mal in period 0, which induces the firm to place its next order in period 2 
rather  than period 3. Thereafter, it returns to its normal four-period cycle, 
but now  its orders  come  in periods  2, 6,  10,  . . . instead  of in periods  3, 7, 
11, ....  A one-time shock leaves a permanent imprint on the firm. 
But different firms react differently to the same sales shock if they are 
at different  stages in their replacement cycles. Indeed, a firm that is pushed 
below its trigger point will respond to this same shock by building up 
inventories in period 0 instead of drawing them down. 
Table 8 shows what happens in the four-firm economy if all firms have 
sales of 6 in period 0. Inventories accumulate at first, and the one-time 
shock converts the smooth behavior shown in table 6 into a rather unusual 
inventory cycle in which stocks decline from 44 to 28 every fourth period 
and then return to 44. Similarly, both deliveries and inventory investment 
go through a four-period limit cycle. This is because the transitory shock 
created a degree of synchronization of orders among firms that was not 
present before. 
Naturally, one does not expect the entire economy to behave this way 
forever. There are many reasons. Most obviously, shocks are not likely 
to be so perfectly correlated. Furthermore, prices would adjust to smooth 
the orders. For  example,  manufacturers would  probably start posting 
higher  prices  in periods  4,  8,  12,  . . . when  orders  are 32  and lower  prices 
in periods  3,  7,  11,  .  . . when  orders  are  zero  so  as  to  encourage  some 464  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1981 
Table 8.  Effects of a Temporary Rise in Sales  on a Four-Firm Economya 
Initial  Inventory 
Period,  inventory,  Sales,  Deliveries,  investment, 
t  Nt  xt  Yt  Nt+1-Nt 
0  40  24  32  8 
1  48  16  14  -2 
2  46  16  14  -2 
3  44  16  0  -16 
4  28  16  32  16 
5  44  16  16  0 
6  44  16  16  0 
7  44  16  0  -16 
8  28  16  32  16 
9  44  16  16  0 
10  44  16  16  0 
11  44  16  0  -16 
b 
Source: Simulations by the author. 
a.  All firms are assumed to have sales of 6 in period 0. 
b.  Cycle repeats in subsequent periods. 
retailers to adjust their ordering schedules. A  simple way to  avoid this 
artificial problem in the simulations is to assume that the economy con- 
sists of four sectors, each of which behaves exactly as shown in table 8, 
but that each is completely out of phase with the others. Sector A experi- 
ences the sales shock in period 0, and hence behaves as in table 8; sector B 
experiences the shock in period 1, and so lags behind by one period; and 
so on. 
Table 9 shows the implied behavior of the four-sector  (sixteen-firm) 
economy. In this more heavily populated economy a noncyclical steady 
state does  reemerge beginning with period  6.  But note  the interesting 
aggregative behavior. A  four-period rise in sales induces inventory ac- 
cumulation at first, followed by some rather abrupt inventory liquidation. 
This behavior-which  is only one of  a variety of possible patterns-is 
precisely the opposite of that predicted by the stock-adjustment model. 
In that model, a transitory and unexpected rise in sales leads to involun- 
tary inventory decumulation followed by a gradual rebuilding of stocks. 
Because this example is contrived, one should not try to draw general 
conclusions from it. In particular, it should not be concluded that transi- 
tory sales increases always lead to inventory accumulation. But the ex- 
ample does show that this outcome is quite possible and that the dynamics 
buried in equation 11 are both interesting and complex. Alan S. Blinder  465 
Table  9. Effects  of a Temporary  Rise in Sales on a Four-Sector,  Sixteen-Firm  Economya 
Initial  Iniventory 
Period,  inventory,  Sales,  Deliveries,  investment,  Itiventory- 
t  Nt  Xt  Yt  Nt+1  -  Nt  sales ratio 
0  160  72  80  8  2.22 
1  168  72  78  6  2.33 
2  174  72  76  4  2.42 
3  178  72  60  -12  2.47 
4  166  64  60  -4  2.59 
5  162  64  62  -2  2.53 
6  160  64  64  0  2.50 
7  160  64  64  0  2.50 
b 
Source: Simulations by the author. 
a.  It is assumed that sector A experiences  an increase in sales in period 0, sector B in period 1, and so on. 
b.  All values are stable in subsequent periods. 
To derive more general results about how the economy responds to a 
transitory sales shock, one must return to equation 11 and consider the 
effects of a shift parameter, Yi, which denotes a uniform rightward shift 
of the density function of sales (an increase in sales).  What effect would 
this have on average deliveries,  Yt? The mathematics of this problem is 
presented in appendix A; the answer is 
(12)  -9Yl  (S  -  s)f(s)  +  F(s)  1 +  0 > 0. 
This equation has a straightforward  intuitive interpretation. The F(s) 
indicates the number of firms placing an order in period t. If  all firms 
experience a unit increase in sales, each of these firms raises its order by 
one unit. This accounts for the second term in  12. The first term repre- 
sents  the firms that  are just pushed below  the  s  trigger point  by  the 
increase in demand. There are f (s)  such firms, and they each order S -  s. 
Equation 12 expresses the increase in aggregate orders as the sum of these 
two components. 
The sign of 0 is critical in what follows. For example, because aggre- 
gate inventory  investment  is Nt+  -Nt  =  Yt-  Xt,  the  effect  of  a transi- 
tory increase in mean sales on mean inventory investment is20 
aA_  =t  1 =  (1 +  0)  -  1 =  0. 
axit  -  axt 
20. Here and throughout  the paper the symbol ANt denotes Nt+l -  Nt. 466  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1981 
So whether inventories rise or fall depends on whether 0 is positive or 
negative. 
Figure 2 depicts two density functions, each with particular values of 
S and s, corresponding respectively to cases in which 0  >  0 and 0  <  0. 
In each panel of the figure the area representing (S  -  s)f(s)  is shaded 
horizontally and the area representing F(s)  is shaded vertically.21 The 
sum of these two areas is 1 +  0, and the area under the density function 
is 1.0. It is clear that the shape of the density function and the values of 
S and s are crucial to the value of 0. In principle these are related since 
the distribution of carry-over stocks reflects the interaction of the distri- 
bution of sales and the S, s policy, which itself depends on the distribution 
of sales. 
In the top panel of figure 2 the density function of carry-over stocks, 
f (Q),  has a shape similar to a normal density and most firms have carry- 
over stocks below s. It is clear that the areas labeled F (s)  and (S -s)  f (s) 
add up to more than the area under the density function. Thus 0 is posi- 
tive.  Economically,  this  means  that  the  additional  orders from  those 
firms that place orders overwhelm the declining stocks of the firms that 
do not place orders. Hence a rise in sales leads to an increase in average 
inventories. 
The bottom panel of figure 2 shows the other case. Here the density 
function of Q displays a strong negative skewness. The S, s model makes 
such a shape quite plausible because it implies that the density function 
of initial inventories always has a mass of probability at S. In this panel 
F(s)  is rather small, and the horizontally shaded areas, (S -  s)f (s),  are 
less than 1 -  F(s).  Hence 0 is negative. 
Both cases are possible. All that is known on a priori grounds is that 
0 must exceed -1  because 1 +  0 must be positive. 
Notice also that 0 need not be constant over time. Even if S and s are 
constant, the distribution function F(Q)  changes over time,  reflecting 
fluctuations in sales, and hence so does 0. In most of my empirical work, 
0 is treated as a constant; information on changes in the shape of the dis- 
tribution of carry-over stocks is simply not available. 
Finally, recall from the simulation model that the derivative (equation 
12) is only the tip of the iceberg; it indicates the impact effect of a transi- 
tory sales shock. But such a shock sets in motion  a complex  dynamic 
21.  Since XO  denotes the minimum  possible value of sales, S is necessarily  larger 
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Figure 2.  Distribution of Carry-over Stocks  across Firn4sa 
a.  The 6 is the effect of mean sales on mean inventory investment. The Q is the carry-over  stock. 468  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1981 
inventory adjustment process that may well  be  cyclical.  This  must be 
taken into account in the econometric formulation. 
Experiment 2: A Rise in Initial Inventories.  Consider what will hap- 
pen if each firm discovers that it has some additional units in inventory 
and that nothing has happened to make it want to change either S or s. 
Empirically this is meant to capture the firm's reactions to above-average 
inventories that arise from mistakes or are the legacy of a past sales shock 
that triggered an order.  (For  example, in experiment 1, firms accumu- 
lated inventories for a while and then liquidated stocks.) 
Because the critical variable for the firm is Q  =  N  -  X,  a positive 
shock to N  is just like a negative shock to X-the  case just analyzed. 
Thus, if the shift parameter 72  is used to connote  a uniform rightward 
shift of the density function of inventories, it follows immediately that 
(13)  -  (1+  0)  <  0. 
(9Y2 
In words, excess inventories always reduce orders. 
Experiment 3: A Shift in the S, s Range.  Thus far I have not considered 
what happens if the firm decides to change its S or s. But, as mentioned 
above, changes in a variety of exogenous variables could make the firm 
want to change its trigger points. Suppose, first, that the entire S, s range 
shifts upward, with no change in (S -  s) and no change in the distributions 
of either initial inventories or sales. (For example, I suggested above that 
a rise in 8, the penalty cost of  back ordering, might have this effect.) 
Clearly, such a change will make inventories too  low  on  average and 
induce firms to accumulate inventories, thus changing the distributions of 
inventories and carry-over stocks in the future. But what will the adjust- 
ment pattern be? 
Table  10 shows the behavior of  the same firm that was depicted in 
table 5 on the assumption that both S and s rise by two units, to S =  18 
and s =  4, in period 0. Instead of waiting until period 3 and ordering six- 
teen units, the firm now places an order in period 2 but orders only four- 
teen units. Other firms react differently because the change in S and s 
happens at different points in their ordering cycles. The behavior of the 
four-firm sector (not shown here)  once again displays a rather unusual 
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Table 10.  Effects of a Rise in S and s on a Single Firma 
Initial  Carry-over  Inventory 
Period,  inventory,  Sales,  stock,  Deliveries,  investment, 
t  Xt  Qt  Yt  Nt+1-Nt 
0  16  4  12  0  -4 
1  12  4  8  0  -4 
2  8  4  4  14  10 
3  18  4  14  0  -4 
4  14  4  10  0  -4 
5  10  4  6  0  -4 
6  6  4  2  16  12 
7  18  4  14  0  -4 
b 
Source: Simulations by the author. 
a.  The rise is two units, to S  =  18 and s  =  4, in period 0. 
b. Cycle repeats in subsequent periods. 
Table 11.  Effects of a Rise in S and s on a Four-Sector, Sixteen-Firm Economya 
Initial  Inventory 
Period,  inventory,  Sales,  Deliveries,  investment,  Inventory- 
t  Nt  xt  Yt  Nt+-  Nt  sales ratio 
0  160  64  80  16  2.50 
1  176  64  78  14  2.75 
2  190  64  76  12  2.97 
3  202  64  60  -4  3.16 
4  198  64  60  -4  3.09 
5  194  64  62  -2  3.03 
6  192  64  64  0  3.00 
7  192  64  64  0  3.00 
b 
Source: Simulations by the author. 
a.  Sector A is assumed to raise S and s in period 0, sector B in period 1, and so on. 
b. All values are stable in subsequent periods. 
Table 1  1 takes the next step and analyzes the behavior of four such 
sectors. One sector raises S and s in period 0; another sector raises S and s 
in period 1; and so on. Here the jagged edges are smoothed out, and a clear 
pattern emerges that resembles overshooting.  Such overshooting in re- 
sponse to a rise in desired inventories can never occur in a stock-adjust- 
ment model. But table 1  1 shows that it can occur in an S, s model even 
though no firm ever allows its inventories to exceed S. 
More formally, if shift parameter 73  denotes a change in an exogenous 470  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1981 
variable that moves S and s equally, and does not change F(Q),  equa- 
tion 11 implies 
(14)  a Yt  I +  0 >  O. 
This derivative is equal and opposite to equation 13, which makes sense. 
If, for some reason, Nt,  S, and s all increase equally at the same time, 
there will be no effect on  Y, 
Experiment 4: A  Widening of the S, s Range.  Not all changes in the 
firm's price and cost structure will induce it to move S and s equally. For 
example, as mentioned, an increase in the fixed cost of purchasing, A, 
would raise S -  s, lower s, and have an unclear effect on S. So it is worth 
exploring what happens if either s or S, but not both,  changes. Let  y4 
denote a change in some parameter that moves S but leaves s unchanged. 
Then, by equation 11, 
(15)  F(s) >  0. 
Alternatively, if y' denotes a change in some parameter that moves s but 
leaves S unchanged, then 
(iSa)~~~~~  (15a)  aaY  -  (S  -  s)f(s) >  0. 
Either sort of  shift raises inventory investment initially,  and then has 
subsequent effects by changing the distribution of  carry-over stocks in 
future periods. 
Clearly, among the three shift parameters-Y3,  Y4,  and y -one  is re- 
dundant  because  y3  is just the sum of 74  and y4.  In what follows I work 
with 73-which  represents equal changes in both S and s and with y4- 
which represents a rise in S and s fixed. 
Experiment 5: An Anticipated Rise in Sales.  Now I come to the source 
of variation in deliveries that I believe is predominant in the data actually 
observed. Suppose that most sales fluctuations experienced by retailers 
are anticipated, so that a higher Xt is preceded by a higher S, s, or both. 
In this case, each rightward shift of the distribution of sales (as in experi- 
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inventories (as in experiment 2).22  Hence the effects of an expected, and 
presumably persistent, increase in sales can be captured by combining the 
experiments conducted above. Specifically, the shift parameter denoting 
an anticipated rise in sales, y5,  is composed of the following combination 
of shift parameters already discussed: a one-unit rise in Yi (an increase in 
sales),  a b unit increase in 72  (an increase in initial inventories),  either an 
a, unit increase in y4  (a widening of the S, s range) or an a2 unit increase 
in y3  (an upward shift of the S, s range). 
The new parameters introduced here have fairly clear intuitive mean- 
ings. The parameters a,  and a2 are like marginal inventory sales ratios; 
they represent the sensitivity of desired inventories to expected sales. The 
derivatives in equation 8, which are for a specific example, lead one to 
expect S, s, or both to respond positively to anticipated sales. Notice that 
this presumption does not quite follow from the mathematics. Hadley and 
Whitin derive equation 7 for a firm whose sales each period are drawn 
from an unchanged probability distribution. The derivatives in equation 8 
thus compare different firms with different but stationary sales distribu- 
tions. I use these results to predict the response of a firm that anticipates a 
change in its own sales distribution for the next period. For this reason, 
I imagine that, in addition to the factors enumerated in 7, the parameters 
al and a2 depend in an important way on how persistent, and hence how 
predictable, demand fluctuations are. More persistent fluctuations, I sur- 
mise, lead to higher values of a, or a2. 
The parameter b, which measures the responsiveness of initial inven- 
tories, Nt,  to expected sales, Xe,  should depend on  all the factors that 
influence a, or a2 and in addition on the degree of uncertainty firms attach 
to the forecasts and on how risk averse they are. 
In what follows I deal with two different models, corresponding to two 
different  ways in which the S, s range may be affected. In model 1, changes 
in  the target inventory range are assumed to  take  the  form  of  equal 
movements in S and s. So the effect of shift parameter  75  on mean orders is 
a 
-  =  1 +  0-b(1  +  0) +  a2(1 +  0) =  (1-b  +  a2)(  +  0), 
'O'Y5  laXe 
22. The firms  that do place orders  will have a higher St and will thus place larger 
orders, resulting  in higher initial inventories the following period. If firms adjust  st 
upward, more firms find themselves tripping the lower barrier and hence placing 
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where the 1 +  0 term comes from the shift in the distribution of sales; 
the b ( 1 +  0  ) term comes from the shift in the distribution of initial inven- 
tories; and thea2 ( 1 +  0) term comes from the shift in S and s. In model 0, 
shocks  to  desired  inventory  holdings  are  assumed  to  correspond  to 
changes in S with s fixed, widening or narrowing the S, s range. Thus the 
effect of the composite shift parameter 75  is 
a 
=aXe  I +  o  -  b(1 +  0) +  ajF(s)  =  (1 -  b)(1 +  0) +  ajF(s), 
where the sales and initial inventory terms are the same as in model 1 and 
the alF(s)  term comes from the shift in S. To economize on notation, I 
introduce the parameter X, which takes on the value X =  1 for model 1 
and X =  0 for model 0, and write the two expressions more succinctly as 
(16)  a  yy  -  aXe -  (1 +  0)(1 -  b) +  Xa2(1  +  0)  +  (1  -  X)aiF(s)  3  K1. 
Experiment 6: An Unanticipated Rise in Sales.  There is one other type 
of composite shock that appears to have empirical relevance: a change in 
the mean of the sales distribution that was not anticipated. By definition, 
an unanticipated sales  shock  cannot  affect beginning-of-period  inven- 
tories. However,  as long as the random process generating sales is not 
independently and identically distributed, sales shocks contain informa- 
tion relevant to predicting future sales and hence induce firms to alter 
their S, s target range. Hence I consider an unanticipated rise in sales, 
X , to be a composite of a unit increase in yi  (a rise in sales)  and either 
an a3 unit increase in /,  (a rise in S alone)  in model 0 or an a4 unit in- 
crease in y3  (a rise in both S and s)  in model 1. 
So, if one denotes the shift parameter representing an unanticipated 
sales shock 76  and once again uses the convenient variable X to capture 
both models in a single expression, the following relation is implied: 
(17)  aa? 
-  a?X  =I  +  0 +  Xa4(1 +  0) +  (1 -  X)a3F(s) = K2, 
where the Xa4( 1 +  0)  +  (1  -  X)a3F(s)  terms come from the appropriate 
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in XFt  on mean deliveries, may be greater than or less than K1, which is the 
effect of a unit increase in XF. In versions of the S, s models in which 
delivery lags are unimportant, there is no  particular implication about 
whether expected or unexpected sales should have the stronger effect on 
inventory investment. This, once  again, stands in sharp contrast to the 
stock-adjustment model. 
As pointed out above, equations like 16 and 17 indicate only the im- 
pact effects of increases in sales, but there are also complicated dynamic 
adjustments inherent in 11. These dynamics need to be captured in the 
econometric specification. 
Empirical Implementation of the S, s Model 
To  create regression equations from this analysis it is  necessary to 
relate the theoretical shift parameters to empirical variables. One must 
also assume that parameters like K1 and K2, which in principle vary, are 
constant through time.  It  will  be  easiest  first to  write down  the  two- 
equation empirical model that is meant to represent the theoretical model 
and then to explain it by components. Thus 
(18)  Yt =  K,X'  +  K2X'  +  K3(qt+l  -  1t) -  (1  +  O)ut  +  Et 
(19)  Nt  =  bX' +  -qt  +ut. 
The first term on the right-hand side of each equation represents the 
effects of anticipated increases in sales. According to experiment 5, a unit 
increase in Xt raises Yt by an amount K1 and raises Nt by b. 
Experiment 6 is interpreted as an unexpected increase in sales,  Xt. 
It was shown that a unit increase in Xu moves Yt by K2 units, but does not 
affect Nt. This is reflected in equations 18 and 19. 
The variable yt  represents exogenous variables other than Xe and Xt 
that influence S and s. As has been shown above in an explicit example, 
interest rates, manufacturer's prices,  and fixed  costs  are among these 
variables. 
A concrete example may help clarify the nature of v. One of the de- 
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in A is expected to widen the S, s range. Suppose this happens by raising 
S with s fixed.23  Let X denote the derivative dS/dA.  Then, according to 
experiment 3, an increase in A by 1/o  units would push S up by one unit 
and raise Yt by 1 +  0 units. Hence, if A were the only factor determining 
S and s, one would simply define 1 as A/X.  Other variables that influence 
S and s, such as interest rates and storage costs, can be handled similarly. 
In the empirical work, 7t is actually a vector of variables. The units of 
measurement  for the elements of y are chosen to make unity the coefficient 
of  7t in equation 19. Variable  7t is dated so that 7t captures the influences 
on beginning-of-period  inventories  and  Yt+i  -  nt captures  the change  in 
these influences during the period. The model therefore implies that a unit 
increase of 1 raises Yt by (1  +  0)  units in model 1 (equal increases in S 
and s)  or by F(s)  units in model 0 (a- rise in S alone).  Once again I can 
economize  on notation  by defining  the coefficient  of Yt+i  -  7it in equation 
18 as 
K3 =  X(1 +  0) +  (1 -  X)F(s)  _F(s)  +  X(S -  s)f(s), 
which encompasses both models. 
The most difficult variable to  explain in equations  18 and  19 is ut, 
which is something akin to undesired inventories. But that description is 
not really accurate because the micro model implies that firms only have 
a desired inventory range, not level, and that they always keep inventories 
within this range. The best way to understand ut is to recall the compli- 
cated dynamic adjustments in the simulation model. After a shock there 
is always a period that has the earmarks of inventory disequilibrium, even 
though each individual firm always has its  inventories where it wants 
them, given its past history and its S, s trigger points. This disequilibrium 
is particularly clear, for example, in table 11 in which there appears to be 
overshooting following a rise in S and s. The variable ut in equations 18 
and 19 is meant to embody the legacy of all past shocks and errors; it is 
the way these  apparently simple equations accommodate the  complex 
dynamics of the S, s model.24 
Equation 19 amounts to a definition of ut. The terms bX" +  77t  can be 
23.  In fact, in the example given above for firms that have exogenous sales and 
minimize long-run costs in a stationary environment, the widened range is accom- 
panied by a reduction  in s. 
24.  The evolution of ut through time is governed by a difference  equation that is 
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thought of as the steady-state level of average inventories-correspond- 
ing, for example, to  the entry 192  in table  11.  Then  ut measures the 
deviation of actual inventories from this steady state, period by period. 
To decide on the proper coefficient for ut in equation 18, one must con- 
nect it with one  of  the experiments in the previous section.  The  most 
natural one  seems to be experiment 2,  which deals with a shift of  the 
distribution of Nt when all the determinants of S and s are held constant. 
Hence the coefficient -  (1  +  0)  is assigned to ut in equation 18. 
Plainly,  there are no  data on  ut to permit estimation of  18  and  19 
directly. There are two routes that can be followed in deriving an estimat- 
ing equation. The most obvious, but I will argue inappropriate, procedure 
is to solve 19 for ut and substitute into 18 to obtain 
(20)  Y, =  [(1 +  0)(I  -  b) +  a,F(s)]X'  +  [1 +  0 +  a3F(s)]Xt 
-  (1 +  0)Nt +  (1 +  0)7ft  +  F(s)[7t+l  -  7t] +  Et 
in model 0 (X =  0),  or 
(21)  Yt =  (1 +  a2)(1 +  0)X' +  (1 +  a4)(1 +  0)Xt 
-  (1 +  0)Nt +  (1 +  0) m7t+l +  Et 
in model  1 (X =  0).  These equations, which may look complicated, are 
actually rather conventional. If one treats yt  as a stochastic disturbance, 
either 20 or 21 can be written as 
Yt  =  A,Xt  +  A2Xt  +  BNt  +  error, 
with suitable interpretations of Al,  A2, and B. This is exactly the econo- 
metric  specification  normally  used  to  represent the  stock-adjustment 
model (compare equation 5).  The only difference is that the parameters 
have very different interpretations. 
However, there is a problem with the error terms in 20  and 21. It is 
most obvious in 20, in which -t  is part of the error term, while 19 implies 
that Nt and yt  have a positive covariance. Thus the coefficient of Nt in 
20 should be biased. The same problem arises in 21 if yt  is serially cor- 476  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1981 
related. There can be little doubt that it is. In the empirical work, yt  is 
represented by 
(22)  7t=  aRt  +  Vt, 
where Rt is a vector of measurable variables that influence S and s such 
as interest rates and manufacturers' prices, and vt is the truly unobserv- 
able component. Thus vt reflects, among other things, changes in the cost 
technology  (storage costs and the ratio A/c),  changes that one expects 
to be persistent and perhaps even permanent-that  is, vt may well be a 
random walk. 
A better way of deriving an estimating equation is found by using the 
model to eliminate ut from equation 18. This is done in appendix B; there 
it is shown that the model can be reformulated as 
(23)  /\Nt  =  -0OANt1  +  [0 +  a,F(s)](Xe  -  Xe1) 
+  [0 +  a3F(s)](Xt  -  Xt_1)  +  (1  +  0)Zt- 
?  F(s)[zt  -  Zt-.]  +  et-  t-, 
in model 0 (X =  0),  or 
(24)  ANt =  -OANt1  +  [0 +  a2(1 +  0)](Xt  -  Xt_1) 
+  [0 +  a4(1  +  0)](Xt  -  Xt_1)  +  (1  +  6)Zt 
+  Et  -  Et-1 
in model 1 (X =  1),  where I introduce the new symbol, zt,  as shorthand 
foryt+,  -  t. 
Equation 24 has some chance of being a legitimate equation for estima- 
tion. The econometric error term in this equation is 
(1  +  0)(Vt+l  -  Vt)  +  (Et  -  Et-1). 
The first term is assumed to be uncorrelated with all the variables in the 
equation, and will be almost independently and identically distributed if 
vt is close to a random walk, which is a plausible case. The second term 
will also be uncorrelated with all the variables in the model. But it will be 
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if  Et is  approximately a random walk,  Et  -  Et-i  will  be  approximately 
"white noise." 
The error term in 23 potentially has a rather complicated serial cor- 
relation structure, even if one is willing to  assume that vt is a random 
walk. However, it will still be orthogonal to all the variables in the equa- 
tion. Thus estimation of 23 and 24 by ordinary least squares seems likely 
to give unbiased coefficient estimates, even if they are inefficient. 
To make 23 or 24 operational, it is only necessary to specify the vari- 
ables in the vector Rt  (see equation 22)  and to obtain a time series on 
expected sales. The latter is explained below. For the former, I have tried 
interest rates and the ratio of manufacturers'  prices, ct, to retail prices, Pt. 
The Data 
Because a firm's optimal choices of S and s are sensitive to its cost and 
demand structures, firms in  different industries are expected  to  make 
quite different choices  of S and s and of the parameters a,  through a4 
above. Thus I decided to work at a level that was as disaggregated as the 
data permitted. In practice, this meant dividing retailing into eight sub- 
sectors. In addition, results are reported for  all retailing. However,  as 
shown below, automobiles dominate the results for all retailing. 
SALES  AND  INVENTORIES 
The basic data on the sales and inventories of retailers are unpublished 
and have only recently become available. The data are monthly and sea- 
sonally adjusted, covering the period from January 1959 through Decem- 
ber 1980.25  Both sales and inventories are deflated by the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis and are expressed in 1972 prices at monthly rates.26 
A word on the overall trend in these data is in order. In the period 
before the first OPEC shock, inventories in most sectors were growing 
faster than sales. Despite  all the talk about improved inventory control 
25. In principle,  seasonally  unadjusted  data would have been preferable,  but these 
are not available in real terms. 
26. The deflation  procedure  for inventories  is a complex one using, among other 
things, information on LIFO (last in, first out)  versus FIFO  (first in, first out) 
accounting  procedures.  The documentation  by the U.S. Bureau  of Economic Analy- 
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Table 12. Descriptive  Statistics  on Sales and  Inventory  Data, by Sector, 
January  1959 to December  1980 
Inventories 
Sales  Variance  of 
inventory  Mean- 
Variance  Mean  investment inventory 
about  inventory  about  sales 
Sector  Meana  trendb  stockc  trend  ratio 
All retailing  34.20  1.3200  46.50  0.1338  1.34 
Durables 
Automobiles  6.45  0.3320  10.14  0.0741  1.53 
Furniture  and appliances  1.66  0.0067  3.58  0.0016  2.12 
Lumber  and hardware  1.75  0.0208  3.83  0.0013  2.22 
Other  durables  1.16  0.0169  3.22  0.0033  2.83 
Nondurables 
Food  7.69  0.0439  5.39  0.0028  0.70 
Apparel  2.02  0.0076  4.80  0.0030  2.39 
General  merchandise  4.88  0.0405  8.89  0.0191  1.80 
Other  nondurables  8.59  0.0436  6.69  0.0062  0.78 
Source: Computed by the author from unpublished data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
a.  Billions of 1972 dollars, at a monthly rate. 
b. Data are detrended by the procedure outlined in note 4. 
c.  Billions of 1972 dollars. 
and economies of scale in inventories, the inventory-sales ratio was gener- 
ally increasing in retailing. (See figure 3, which pertains to all retailing.) 
This basic fact is sometimes read as evidence against the S, s model be- 
cause the square root rule is thought to suggest that inventories should 
grow as the square root of sales. There is no contradiction, however. For 
example, if economic growth is characterized mainly by more firms or by 
firms expanding the number of products they handle rather than by firms 
with fixed product lines growing larger, the square root rule would not be 
relevant to the trend movement in inventories. 
Table 12 offers some descriptive statistics on these data, intended to 
give an idea of the relative sizes of the various sectors and how much of 
the overall variance comes from each sector. It can be seen that there are 
only two large sectors in terms of inventory holding:  automobile dealers 
and general merchandise stores (primarily department stores). It can also 
be seen that the sectors vary widely in how  much inventory they hold 
relative to sales. The inventory-sales ratio is highest in the apparel and 
other durables categories, lowest  in food  and other nondurables. The 
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When one looks at variances in the detrended data, the real dominance 
of the automobile sector is revealed. The variance around trend of auto- 
mobile sales is 71/2 times larger than that of the next largest sector, and 
in fact far exceeds the sum of the variances of all other sectors. In terms 
of inventory investment, the dominance of the automobile industry is even 
more complete. Except for general merchandise, the variance about trend 
of automobile inventory investment is at least twelve times greater than 
that in any other sector. In a word, cyclical inventory variability is essen- 
tially a matter of automobile dealer and department store behavior. 
It is thus worth considering the a priori plausibility of the S, s model 
for automobile dealers and department stores. Department stores appear 
to be an industry in which the S, s rule should apply well. Deliveries pre- 
sumably come in by the truckload, whereas sales are made continuously. 
The  automobile industry presents a less  obvious  case.  A  truckload of 
automobiles is not a very large number, which suggests that the lot size, 
S  -  s,  may be quite small relative to monthly sales for a typical dealer. 
This diminishes the importance of the S, s rule. The need to have a variety 
of models on display and ready for immediate delivery may be a more 
important factor in explaining the size of automobile inventories. Further- 
more,  the  distinction  between  manufacturers' inventories  of  finished 
goods and retail inventories is a slippery one in this industry. While deal- 
ers are generally independent, and quite competitive firms, they are some- 
times thought to be captives of the automobile makers. It may be that the 
makers rather than the dealers decide the inventory holdings  of  auto- 
mobile dealers. 
I have stressed repeatedly that the S, s model has very different em- 
pirical implications from the stock-adjustment model. Table 13 helps to 
distinguish between the two models. It displays, for each retail sector, a 
decomposition of the variance of Y around trend similar to that presented 
above for more aggregated data. Several generalizations can be made. 
First, except for the other durable goods sector, the variance of deliveries 
to retailers, y,  exceeds  the variance of  retail sales,  x.  Second,  the  co- 
variance between sales and inventory change is never a substantial nega- 
tive number; it is either positive or virtually zero. These two facts make it 
very difficult to believe that the main role of retail inventories is to serve 
as a buffer stock.27  If firms want to use inventories to cushion Yt against 
27.  In fact, it was data like these that first led me to investigate the S, s model 
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Table 13. Decomposition  of the Variance  of Deliveries  to Retailers  around  Trend, 
by Sector,  January  1959 to December  1980a 
var (y)  var(An) 
Sector  var(y)  var(x)  var(An)  2cov(x, An)  var (x)  var(x) 
All retailing  1.620  1.320  0.134  0.1410  1.15  0.10 
Durables  0.794  0.636  0.088  0.0824  1.25  0.14 
Automobiles  0.454  0.332  0.074  0.0491  1.37  0.22 
Furniture  and 
appliances  0.009  0.007  0.002  0.0090  1.31  0.24 
Lumber  and 
hardware  0.023  0.021  0.001  0.0015  1.10  0.06 
Other  durables  0.013  0.017  0.003  -0.0007  0.76  0.19 
Nondurables  2.600  2.030  0.370  0.0919  1.28  0.18 
Food  0.047  0.044  0.003  -0.0004  1.07  0.06 
Apparel  0.010  0.008  0.003  -0.0003  1.35  0.39 
General  merchandise  0.067  0.041  0.019  0.0051  1.65  0.47 
Other  nondurables  0.046  0.044  0.006  -0.0023  1.06  0.14 
Source: Same as table 12. 
a.  Sales and deliveries are in billions of dollars, at monthly rates. 
fluctuations in xt, it seems odd that var(y)  > var(x).  It seems even odder, 
if inventories are primarily a buffer, that An and x do not covary nega- 
tively. 
SALES  EXPECTATIONS 
The model requires that sales be divided into expected and unexpected 
components. I started with a variety of proxies for expectations. How- 
ever, since they all led to roughly the same results, I report equations 
based on only one. Specifically, in the estimates presented here, firms are 
assumed to estimate (or know)  a demand curve, 
(25)  Xt  =  a(L)  Xt-1  +  b(L) Pt  +  c(L) PIt  +  error, 
where the first term is a fourth-order distributed lag on past sales, the 
second is a distributed lag on the industry's relative price (relative to the 
personal consumption deflator), and the third is a distributed lag on real 
personal income.28 The b (L)  and c(L)  parameters were estimated ini- 
tially as free distributed lags, with lags going back as far as one year. 
28.  In fact, equation 25 was estimated on detrended data, and then the trend 
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Then, using a series of F-tests, the lag length was reduced if there was no 
deterioration in the fit. 
In order to use 25 to generate forecasts, it is necessary to forecast the 
contemporaneous values of relative price and real personal income. Rela- 
tive prices are forecast by an autoregression. Personal income is forecast 
in  two  ways:  by  an  autoregression and by  an  autoregression supple- 
mented by publicly available macroeconomic forecasts. Two sources of 
real GNP forecasts were tried: the consensus forecast of  the National 
Bureau of Economic Research-American Statistical Association and that 
of Wharton-Econometric Forecasting Associates, Inc.29  However, I found 
that neither forecast was a significant determinant of PI after controlling 
for PItl,  PIt2,  ....  For this reason, the macro forecasts were discarded, 
and personal income was predicted by an autoregression.30 
INTEREST  RATES 
One long-standing problem in the empirical inventory literature has 
been the inability to uncover significant interest rate effects, even though 
every theory of inventory holding insists that they should be present.31 
The  usual intertemporal substitution variable in  optimizing models  of 
inventory behavior (and the S, s model is no exception)  is the so-called 
own real interest rate, that is, the nominal interest rate minus the expected 
rate of inflation of the firm's product. The reason for this is quite straight- 
29.  In each case I interpolate  monthly forecasts from the quarterly  data. I would 
like to thank Victor Zarnowitz for providing the NBER-ASA forecasts and Jeffrey 
Green for providing  the Wharton  forecasts. 
30.  The other proxies for expectations were simpler. One was a fourth-order 
autoregression  in sales-that  is, equation 25 with b(L)  and c(L)  constrained to 
zero. The other was the retailer proxy forecast, a simple rule of thumb suggested 
by Irvine. See F. Owen Irvine, Jr., "Retail  Inventory  Investment." 
31.  See, however, a series of recent papers  on the subject by F. Owen Irvine, Jr.: 
"The Influence of  Capital Costs on Inventory Investment: Time Series Evidence 
for  a  Department  Store,"  Quarterly  Review  of  Economics  and  Business,  forth- 
coming; "Merchant Wholesaler Inventory Investment and the Cost of  Capital," 
American  Economic  Review,  vol.  71  (May  1981,  Papers  anid Proceedings,  1980), 
pp. 23-29; and "Retail Inventory Investment."  See also Laura S. Rubin, "Aggregate 
Inventory Behavior: Response to Uncertainty and Interest Rates," Journal of Post 
Keynesian Economics, vol. 2  (Winter 1979-80),  pp. 20 1-1 1; and Charles Lieber- 
man, "Inventory  Demand and Cost of Capital Effects," Review of Economics and 
Statistics,  vol.  62  (August  1980),  pp. 348-56. Alan S. Blinder  483 
forward. A decision to hold a finished good in inventory for one period 
entails forgoing the current price, Pt, today to receive the expected future 
price, P+,  one period later. If the nominal interest rate is it, the effective 
cost of this storage activity (ignoring explicit storage costs)  is 
(1 +  it)Pt  =Pt+  (1  +  it)  -  (1 ? 
Wt) =  it  t, 
Pt 
where 7t is the anticipated rate of nominal capital gain. Therefore inter- 
temporal substitution can be captured by including it -7t  in the equation. 
However,  there is  at least  one  theoretical consideration  that points 
toward using the nominal interest rate instead. Many retailers (and per- 
haps manufacturers as well)  are thought to  follow  a first in, first out 
(FIFO)  pricing strategy: once a finished good is placed on the shelves, it 
is given a price tag that remains on the item regardless of what subse- 
quently happens to the price of newly produced goods. Everyone has at 
one time or another bought some durable good that was the last one at a 
given price because the next shipment would have higher priced merchan- 
dise.  To  many economists  the  rationality of  this practice has  seemed 
dubious. But Arthur Okun recently suggested that FIFO pricing may be 
rational when there are long-standing customer relations.32  If FIFO pric- 
ing really is prevalent, the real interest rate is not the appropriate inter- 
temporal price. If a firm pays it to hold a commodity in inventory but 
does not earn the price appreciation, 7t,  when it  sells  the commodity 
(because  the old price tag remained on the commodity),  the nominal 
interest rate is the "correct" cost of capital. For this and other reasons, 
I use the nominal interest rate and the expected rate of inflation as sepa- 
rate variables rather than using the difference between them.33 
What about taxes? Suppose first that the real interest rate specification 
is the correct one. Since inventories of retailers are, by definition, part of 
their normal business, price appreciation on inventory holdings is tax- 
32.  Arthur M. Okun, Prices  and Quantities:  A Macroeconomic  Analysis  (Brook- 
ings Institution, 1981), pp. 155-60. Okun also made the intriguing  suggestion that 
the desire to use a FIFO pricing strategy (so as not to break a trust with the firm's 
regular customers) may explain why firms use FIFO accounting. 
33. For discussion  of these other reasons and some evidence that the coefficients 
of it and 7Tt are not equal and opposite, see Irvine, "Merchant  Wholesaler Inventory 
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able as ordinary income under FIFO  accounting. So the real after-tax 
cost of capital under FIFO is 
(26a)  (1  -  Tt)(it  -  1t), 
where -rt  is the marginal corporate income tax rate. But if firms use last in, 
first out (LIFO)  accounting, they can essentially escape taxation on their 
nominal capital gains, making the cost of capital 
(26b)  (1 -  Tt)it  -t 
Finally, suppose the nominal interest rate specification is the correct one 
because firms are FIFO pricers. Then the relevant after-tax cost of capital 
would be 
(26c)  (1 -  Tt)it. 
Since the  statutory corporate income  tax  rate has  been  changed only 
slightly (and infrequently)  since 1959, not much is lost by treating r as 
constant in empirical work. Once this is done, all three versions of equa- 
tion 26 can be handled by simply allowing the nominal rate of interest 
and the expected rate of  inflation to enter the regression separately as 
determinants of -,  and embedding the factor (1-)  in the appropriate 
slope coefficients. 
The nominal interest rate is measured by the bank prime lending rate. 
Expected  inflation rates are obtained by  fitting autoregressions to  the 
levels  of  absolute  prices  in  each  sector,  using these  to  compute  one- 
month-ahead forecasts, and then converting the forecasts into monthly 
inflation rates. (The prime rate is also entered as a monthly rate.) 
MANUFACTURERS'  PRICES 
Among the variables that the S, s model suggests should influence the 
target inventory range is the ratio of the manufacturers' selling price, ct, 
to the retailers' selling price, Pt. This ratio is computed separately for 
each sector by matching up the retail sectors with corresponding com- 
ponents of the producer price index. (The matchup is presented and dis- 
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STOCK-ADJUSTMENT  REGRESSIONS 
Before looking at the empirical results for my rather unconventional 
model of inventory behavior, it may be useful to investigate first what 
happens when these data are used to estimate a standard stock-adjustment 
model. I argued above that this model lacks a persuasive theoretical ra- 
tionale for retailers and that the coefficient of Nt will be afflicted by least- 
squares bias if the S, s model is correct. 
Table  14 displays estimates of the stock-adjustment model described 
in equation 4 for all retailing and for eight subsectors: 
Nt+  -Nt  =  X(N* -  Nt)  -  IXt'  +  ?t, 
where 
N*  =  a +  bXt  +  Clit  +  C2Wrt, 
which together imply 
(27)  Yt = Xa +  (1 + Xb)X? + (1 -  )Xtu-XNt 
+  XClit  +  XC27t  +  Et. 
Several observations summarize the results. First, the model does rather 
well in goodness  of fit,34  but in some  sectors  (especially  automobiles) 
there is  an indication  of  autocorrelation in  the residuals. Second,  the 
estimates of  X, the  speed  of  adjustment, are totally  implausible.  The 
highest is merely 0.14  (14  percent a month!)  while the lowest is 0.03. 
These simply do not make sense. Third, the coefficients of expected and 
unexpected sales are sometimes quite close together.35  This finding makes 
little sense in the context of equation 27 since the coefficient of X" should 
34. This is hardly surprising  with trend-dominated  data. However, even when 
the regressions  were performed  on detrended  data, the R2  ranged from 0.66 to 0.95. 
35. By a standard  F-test, the null hypothesis that the coefficients  of expected and 
unexpected  sales are equal-that  is, that only actual sales appears  on the right-hand 
side-can  be rejected in only four of the eight sectors. It can, however, be argued 
that there is an econometric bias when expectations are measured with error. This 
would bias the coefficient of  unexpected sales toward the coefficient of  expected 
sales. The argument  is fully presented  in J. David Germany, "Unanticipated  Money 
Growtht,  Inventories, and the Business Cycle" (Ph.D.  dissertation, Massachusetts 
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exceed the coefficient of X"'  by Xb +  /3. Fourth, interest rate effects are of 
the correct (negative)  sign in all sectors except one, but are significant in 
only two sectors.36  And fifth, the expected rate of inflation performs much 
worse, with the correct (positive)  sign in only four of the eight sectors 
and a significantly positive  coefficient only  for general merchandising. 
The hypothesis that the coefficients of the nominal interest rate and the 
inflation rate are equal and opposite, in other words, that it is the real rate 
of interest that matters, does not seem to hold for any sector except gen- 
eral merchandise. 
The S, s model offers an explanation of the puzzling results found in 
these tables and also provides a way to assess the quantitative importance 
of  the aforementioned least  squares bias.  The  regressions in  table  14 
seem to suggest a simple model of the form 
(28)  Yt =  AXt +  BNt +  error, 
with A  somewhat  larger than  unity  and B  a  small  negative  number. 
Viewed  as estimates of  equation 27,  these results do  not  make much 
sense. But suppose instead that the data were generated by the S, s model. 
Could one then make sense of the parameter estimates? 
To  answer this  question,  consider  a  simplified version  of  the  S,  s 
model-equations  18 and 19-in  which K1 =  K2 (so that only X,,  not its 
division into Xte  +  Xt",  matters)  and in which ut is zero every period:37 
(29)  Yt =  K1Xt +  K3(-qt+1  -  t)  +  Et 
(30)  Nt=  bXt  +  t. 
It is a straightforward  but tedious computation to use 29 and 30 to calcu- 
36. Because the interest rate coefficient in these tables shows the effect of  the 
monthly rate of interest (in percentage  points) on the monthly rate of deliveries, it 
also shows (approximately) the effect of the annual rate of interest on the annual 
rate of  deliveries. For example, in the equation for all retailing in table 14, the 
-0.401  coefficient  means that a 1 percentage  point rise in the nominal interest rate 
would decrease annual deliveries by $401 million at annual rates. 
37. This is not really legitimate. I do it only for the following reason. If ut were 
included, all the expressions I present below would have complicated additional 
terms involving the variance of ut and its covariances with other variables. These 
expressions  are always of indeterminate  sign, and so it is never clear how they would 
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late the variances and covariances among the variables X,  Y, and N, and 
then to put these into the standard formulas for the ordinary least squares 
regression coefficients in 28. The results are: 
plim 
A 
=  K1 +  (1  -  p)bK3 
plim  B  =  -(1-  p)K3, 
where p is the simple correlation coefficient between yt,  and yt.  Recall 
A 
that I have argued that p should be close to  1.0. If p is high, then B in 
equation 28 is a badly biased estimate of -K3  while A in 28 is a nearly 
unbiased estimate of K1. These a priori notions seem quite consistent with 
the empirical results, which show small negative B and A  in excess  of 
unity. In summary, if the S, s  model is  correct, the least  squares bias 
afflicting 28 could well be strong enough to produce the results that were 
actually found.38 
S,  S  MODEL  REGRESSIONS 
The S, s model derived above is represented as model 0 and model 1 by 
equations 23 and 24 for model 0 and model 1, respectively. To these are 
added,  for empirical  purposes,  zt  =  t+l-t  and 
(31)  nt+l  =  alit  +  a27rt  +  a3  (p  ) +  Vt+i. 
The equations are clearly nonlinear in the parameters, and so  were 
estimated by nonlinear least squares. Results for model 0 and model  1 
are reported in tables 15 and 16, respectively. Before looking at the de- 
tails, some broad generalizations are possible. 
First, the fit of the equations is quite good, despite their small R2. The 
left-hand variable in these regressions is inventory investment, Yt -Xt, 
whereas in the stock-adjustment regressions it was just Yt. Hence  the 
standard errors of the two sets of regressions are comparable, not their 
R2. The standard errors in tables 15 and 16 are almost as low as those in 
table 14 despite the absence of the variable Nt from the S, s regressions.39 
38. But see note 37. 
39.  I have just argued that Nt is correlated  with the error term and hence is not 
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Second, there is a surprising absence of serial correlation in the residuals. 
In  terms of  the underlying model,  this  suggests either that  Et  can  be 
modeled well as a random walk or that the variance of  Et is trivial com- 
pared to the variance of vt  (which, in turn, is nearly a random walk). 
Third, estimates using other proxies for expectations (not reported here) 
show that the parameters are quite insensitive to the way expectations are 
measured. Fourth, those parameters that are common to the two models 
(such as 0)  have more or less the same point estimates in model 0 and 
model 1. 
I turn now to the parameter estimates, beginning (because it is slightly 
simpler) with model 1, which assumes that changes in interest rates, cost 
conditions, and so forth always move S and s equally. 
The most important parameter in the model is 0, which was defined in 
equation 12. The one restriction on 0 is that 1 +  0 >  0, and all the esti- 
mates easily satisfy this restriction. As indicated in figure 2, a priori rea- 
soning cannot determine the sign of  0, but does suggest that very large 
negative 0 are unlikely. In fact, the estimate of 0 is positive in four sectors 
and negative in the other four. None  of the point estimates seems im- 
plausible. Note that 1 +  0 is analogous to the speed-of-adjustment param- 
eter in the stock-adjustment model.40 In these estimates,  1 +  0 ranges 
from 0.67 to 1.19. These are quite rapid monthly adjustment speeds. 
Unlike the parameter 0, which arises from the aggregation process and 
has no counterpart at the micro level, the parameters a2 and a4 do have 
clear economic  interpretations. Each is like a marginal inventory-sales 
ratio. Specifically, a2 is the marginal effect on S and s of a unit increase in 
expected sales, and a4 is the corresponding effect of  a unit increase in 
unexpected sales. Hence  one  expects  each to  be positive  and, if some 
inventories are required for display purposes, to be less than the average 
inventory-sales ratio. 
Viewed from this perspective, most of the estimates of a2 are reason- 
able. The d2 never exceeds the average inventory-sales ratio (which was 
reported in table 12).  Of the nine cases in the table, d2 is positive in six; 
the only really bothersome sector appears to be food, where the estimated 
a2 is significantly negative. The results for a4 are not as good. The esti- 
mated a4 is  always below  the  average inventory-sales ratios, but a4 is 
negative in five of nine cases, including all the nondurable goods sectors. 
40.  Experiment 2  above shows that one  unit of  unwanted inventories leads 
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Parameter a1 measures the  marginal effect  of  the  monthly  rate  of 
interest in percentage points on the steady-state inventory level (see equa- 
tion 31).  It obtains the correct (negative)  sign in only three sectors and 
is never significantly negative. One cannot help wondering whether the 
positive coefficients do not reflect reverse causation (borrowing to finance 
inventory investment raises the prime rate).  But, in any case, the coeffi- 
cients are all quite small. For example, the coefficient of approximately 
0.85  in the all-retailing equation in table  16 means that a 1 percentage 
point rise in the annual rate of interest (a  1/12th  percentage point rise 
in the monthly rate of interest)  adds about $71 million in  1972 dollars 
to steady-state retail inventory stocks. This is a trivial sum. 
The results for the expected rate of inflation (parameter a2)  are no 
better. Here the theoretically correct (positive)  sign emerges in five of 
the nine cases, but the only sector that yields a correctly signed and statis- 
tically significant inflation effect is general merchandise. The coefficient 
is trivially small, however. It implies that a 1 percentage point rise in the 
steady-state annual rate of inflation would add only about $5 million to 
the steady-state level of inventory holdings. 
Finally, the impact of the nominal interest rate is generally far stronger 
than that of the expected rate of inflation. This reinforces a priori expecta- 
tions and also the findings of Irvine.4' 
The last parameter, a3, indicates the impact of the ratio of buying prices 
to  selling  prices  (that  is,  the  retailer's margin)  on  desired inventory 
stocks. This variable, Ct/pt,  has the correct (negative)  sign in the aggre- 
gate and in four of the eight sectors, and its effect is roughly statistically 
significant in the aggregate and in the food and other nondurable sectors. 
More important, the estimated effects are large enough to be economically 
important. The point estimate of roughly -13.2  for retailing as a whole 
means that a rise of 0.1 in the ratio of buying to selling prices (roughly 
a 10 percent decline in retailers' margins) reduces inventory investment 
by $884  million at a monthly rate, or $10.6  billion at an annual rate in 
the first month. This is a substantial impact. However, the effect dwindles, 
and the ultimate effect of a permanent decline of 0.1 in ct/pt  is to reduce 
steady-state inventories by only $1.32 billion. 
A much briefer description of the estimates of model 0 (table 15)  can 
be given because most of the parameters are common to the two models. 
41.  See Irvine, "Merchant Wholesaler Inventory Investment and the Cost of 
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The 0, for example, has virtually the same point estimates in the two 
models.42 
The important new parameter is F(s),  which has no  counterpart in 
model 1 and provides another test of the model's validity because values 
outside the (0,  1  ) range are theoretically inadmissible. In fact, all nine of 
the point estimates fall comfortably within this range, and many differ 
significantly from both 0 and 1. 
In this model, a1 and a3 play the role of marginal inventory-sales ratios, 
but their interpretations are slightly different from a2 and a4 in model  1. 
Specifically, a,  indicates the marginal effect on S of  a unit increase in 
expected sales, and a3 indicates the corresponding effect of a unit increase 
in unexpected sales. Here, because s is held fixed, a1 and a3 are analogous 
to double the marginal inventory sales ratio,43  and so one expects them 
to be about twice as large as a2 and a4 in model  1. In a rough way the 
point estimates confirm this expectation. Using the standard that a1 and a3 
should always be less  than twice the average inventory-sales ratio, no 
instances are found in which either a1 or a3 is too large. However, just as 
in model 1, negative values of a are common in the nondurable sectors. 
The interest rate and relative price variables do not perform any better 
in model 0 than in model 1. 
Econometric results such as these are always like bottles half full and 
half empty. My own view is that the results are, on balance, favorable to 
the model. Unlike the stock-adjustment regressions, where almost none 
of the estimated parameters make sense in the light of the theory, most, 
though certainly not all, of the estimated parameters of the S, s model are 
consistent with the underlying theory. 
42.  However, model 0, unlike model 1, has convergence  problems  in several sec- 
tors. I believe this is due to extreme multicollinearity  in the data. To avoid the prob- 
lem, I estimate the model 0 equation for the furniture and appliances and apparel 
sectors with detrended (and hence far less collinear)  data. The results with de- 
trended data are reported in table 15 for these two sectors. 
43.  If inventories were distributed  uniformly on the interval [s, S]-a  condition 
not implied in the present model-average  inventories  would be 
N  +S-s 
2 
Thus with s fixed the marginal  inventory  sales ratio would be 
AN  1 as  1 
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ADDITIONAL  TESTS 
A number of further tests of the model yield generally favorable results. 
First, the model is estimated with detrended data, with results that are 
quite similar to those presented here. Hence the estimates are not domi- 
nated by common trends. Second, an examination of equations 23  and 
24-along  with  equation  31,  which  defines  yt-shows  that while  24 
is  exactly  identified, 23  is  overidentified, reflecting the  fact  that both 
z and Az are included in the equation. Specifically, as compared to  an 
unconstrained linear regression, model 0 places two overidentifying re- 
strictions on the data. These restrictions can be tested directly by a stan- 
dard x2-test.44  When this is done, the overidentifying restrictions are never 
rejected; the data and the model are compatible. 
One final issue is worth exploring. Recall that the central parameter 0 
is defined as 0 =  (S  -  s)f(s)  -(1  -  F(s)),  where f(  )  is the density 
function of Q =  N  -  X and F(*)  is the corresponding cumulative distri- 
bution function. There is no reason to think that 0 is constant through 
time. Yet, as an expedient to permit estimation, 0 has been assumed to be 
constant. 
I have tried only one way to  improve this procedure by  allowing  0 
to depend on some observable variable. My candidate is last period's sales 
surprise, Xut,  which should have important effects on this period's initial 
inventories, Nt.  The problem is that there is no  a priori notion  about 
which way this effect might go. On the one hand, a positive sales surprise 
makes some firms carry fewer inventories into the next period than they 
would otherwise. On the other hand, firms that are pushed below the s 
trigger point by the sales  surprise take more inventories into  the next 
period. The net result is unclear. 
Nonetheless, as an experiment, I ran a set of regressions for each model 
on the assumption that 0 depends linearly on Xu1, namely, 
0  =  00 +  1XIt-1. 
Since  0  appears in almost all the slope  coefficients in 23  and 24,  this 
amendment complicates the estimating equations. Rather than show  a 
44. The x2-test for nonlinear regressions is described in Stephen M. Goldfeld 
and Richard  E.  Quandt,  Nonlinear  Methods  in Econometrics  (Amsterdam:  North- 
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Table 17. Estimated  Equations  for the Automobile  Industry,  with and without 
the 0, Parametera 
Model  0  Model I 
Parameter  and  Estimateb  Parameter  and  Estimateb 
summary  -  summary 
statistic  With  0i  Without  01  statistic  With  0o  Withouit  0O 
Oo  -0.24  -0.29  O  -0.25  -0.32 
(0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
0i  0.00W  -0.00038  0i  0. 0oo  -0.00039 
(0.00013)  (0.00010) 
F(s)  0.40  0.82  ...  ...  ... 
(0.14)  (0.48) 
a,  0.67  0.41  a2  0.38  0.56 
(0.34)  (0.30)  (0.15)  (0.17) 
a3  0.71  0.41  a4  0.41  0.55 
(0.34)  (0.27)  (0.14)  (0.16) 
al  0.353  0.694  al  0.489  0.733 
(0.684)  (0.620)  (0.594)  (0.570) 
0a2  -0.094  -0.017  a2  -0.015  -0.035 
(0.060)  (0.032)  (0.031)  (0.033) 
a03  2.70  3.75  a3  3.95  5.87 
(4.55)  (3.69)  (2.81)  (2.95) 
Standard  error  Standard  error 
of estimate  0.267  0.263  of estimate  0.266  0.260 
R2  0.083  0.114  R2  0.082  0.132 
Durbin-Watson  2.00  2.02  Durbin-Watson  1.98  2.08 
Source: Same as table 12. 
a.  See table 15, note a. 
b. Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. 
c.  Constrained. 
complete set of results-which,  for the most part, look just like tables 15 
and  16-I  simply report that the  x2-test rejected the  null  hypothesis 
0=  0 for all retailing and for the automobile sector, but for no other 
sector. 
Examination of  the estimated equations  (not  reported here)  shows 
that the parameter estimates for the all-retailing sector changed little even 
though 0, was significantly negative  (meaning that a positive sales sur- 
prise last period reduces this period's 0).  However, the estimates for the 
automobile  sector  did  change  noticeably.  Because  this  industry is  so 
important in terms of cyclical activity, table 17 compares the regression 
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F(s)  rises from 0.40 to 0.82, and the parameters a. and a3 fall from 0.67, 
0.71  to  0.41,  0.41,  respectively.  Parameter changes  in  model  1  are 
smaller. 
Inventory Behavior in 1979 and 1980 
Can the events of 1979-80  be explained using this knowledge of inven- 
tory behavior? As will be seen, the S, s model is not quite up to the task, 
although it does better than the stock-adjustment model. 
Table  18.  Real Inventory Investment, 1979:1  to 1980:4a 
Billions of  1972 dollars 
Year and quarter  Entire economy  Retail sectorb 
1979:1  15.4  0.0 
2  18.4  6.0 
3  7.6  -1.1 
4  -0.7  -5.3 
1980:1  -0.9  -7.5 
2  1.3  -0.6 
3  -5.0  1.3 
4  -7.2  -1.9 
Sources: Data for the entire economy are from the national income and product accounts; the retail 
sector is based on unpublished data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
a.  At seasonally adjusted annual rates. 
b.  Aggregated from monthly data. 
There  are three main puzzles  about inventory behavior  during the 
1979-80  episode (see table 18). First, real inventory investment peaked in 
1979:2,  a full three quarters before real GNP peaked, and then troughed 
in 1980:1,  which was the GNP peak. By contrast, inventory investment 
has typically peaked in the same quarter as GNP, or perhaps one quarter 
before, in previous recessions. The second puzzle is that inventory invest- 
ment rose  (slightly)  during the recession, which is somewhat unprece- 
dented. And the third is that inventories were liquidated while sales were 
expanding briskly in the second half of 1980. 
Much of this unusual behavior of aggregate inventory investment can 
be  traced to  retail inventory investment.  Clearly, both  the  decline  in 
inventory investment from 1979:2  to  1980:1  and the rise from 1980:1 
to  1980:2  came mainly from the retail sector. However, the sharp turn 
toward liquidation late in 1980 did not come from retailing, where inven- Alan S. Blinder  497 
tory stocks were fairly constant after March. Hence I focus on the 1980 
recession period and on the first two puzzles. 
Two hypotheses about inventory behavior during the recession appear 
frequently in the news media but receive little  support from the data. 
According to the first of these, firms suffered so much during the 1973-75 
recession that they permanently changed their inventory management 
techniques and kept their inventories trimmer relative to sales than pre- 
viously.  The  other hypothesis  agrees that inventory management pro- 
cedures changed permanently during the 1970s but attributes the shift to 
computerization rather than to the recession.45 
The data do not support these hypotheses, however. Figure 3 shows 
the time series behavior of the inventory-sales ratio in retailing; the down- 
ward deflection at OPEC-1 was quite trivial. The picture for the entire 
economy is even more damaging to the hypothesis. The ratio of real in- 
ventories to final sales shows a pronounced downward trend until about 
1966, a pronounced upward trend between 1966 and 1970, and no trend 
since then. Inventory-sales ratios have  averaged about the  same since 
OPEC-1 as they did between 1969 and 1973. 
An alternative hypothesis is that the 1980 recession, unlike earlier re- 
cessions, was forecast far in advance.  (Indeed,  many forecasters were 
predicting a recession a year or more before it  actually began.)  As  a 
consequence, firms kept inventories lean and did not experience the tradi- 
tional  surprising drop  in  sales  that leads  to  an unwanted buildup  in 
inventories and a subsequent liquidation. According to this hypothesis, it 
was the absence of any need to liquidate inventories at the trough that 
enabled the economy to get through what was actually a severe recession 
in terms of final sales with such a small rise in unemployment and in such 
a short time. The data in table 18 seem quite consistent with this hypoth- 
esis,  especially  for  retailing. Note  in  particular that  inventories  were 
being reduced sharply even though final sales were growing in  1979:4 
and 1980:1.  This behavior seems consistent with the idea that retailers 
were anticipating a recession. 
To tell the story of 1979-80  in terms of the model, I use the time series 
on expected sales, Xe, and unexpected sales, Xu, to generate the predicted 
values of inventory investment from the equations in table  14 for the 
45.  On the latter, see Lewis Beman, "A Big Payoff from Inventory Controls," 
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Table 19. Retail  Sales and  Inventory  Investment,  April 1979 to June 1980a 
Millions  of 1972  dollars 




Actual,  Unexpected,  Actual,  adjustment Model  Model 
Year and month  xt  xt  ANt  model  0  1 
1979, April  46,646  -360  348  106  190  174 
May  46,800  301  731  -8  180  188 
June  46,312  -296  429  -18  496  462 
July  46,422  195  1,064  -88  177  163 
August  47,620  883  -86  -146  301  322 
September  48,223  626  -1,262  -95  -225  -132 
October  47,125  -646  477  43  -263  -160 
November  47,389  262  -483  -149  161  179 
December  47,565  273  -1,313  -89  -133  -105 
1980, January  47,997  900  -1,048  -90  -561  -511 
February  46,917  -714  -538  94  -197  -98 
March  45,482  -927  -291  -89  -178  -54 
April  44,225  -1,383  276  -124  18  -83 
May  43,880  -487  -296  -249  13  -204 
June  44,407  73  -130  -179  -123  -143 
Sources: Actual sales and inventory investment are based on  unpublished data from  the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis; model predictions, on simulations by the author. 
a.  Monthly rates. 
stock-adjustment model, table 15 for model 0, and table 16 for model 1. 
However, since the evidence indicates that Xu1  was a significant deter- 
minant of  0 in all retailing and in the automobile sector, the equations 
having this augmented specification were used for these sectors. 
Table  19 shows what actually happened to retail sales and inventory 
investment between April  1979  and June 1980,  which seems to be the 
interesting period, and what the three models predict. 
The table gives two overall impressions: first, that none of the models 
does a very good job of  accounting for inventory behavior during this 
period (even though it was part of the sample period);  second, that the 
stock-adjustment model  behaves  quite  sluggishly.  It  seems  quite  in- 
capable of predicting large inventory movements even when there are 
large sales surprises. 
The period from April to July 1979 was one of rapid inventory accu- 
mulation by retailers, and table  19  shows  that this  accumulation was Alan S. Blinder  499 
poorly predicted by all the models. The stock-adjustment model predicts 
no net change in inventory levels during these months. The S, s model 
does  far better, but still underpredicts the  amount of  accumulation- 
especially in July, when the equation residuals are about 21/2 standard 
errors. Thus there was some unusual inventory accumulation going on 
during these months, especially in July. Disaggregated data show that 
a good deal of this unusual behavior was accounted for by automobile 
dealers, though other retailers were heavily involved in June and July. 
August 1979 was, according to my expectations measure, a period in 
which there was a big, positive, sales surprise. In view of how large and 
how abrupt the sales increase was, the amount of inventory liquidation 
was quite small in the aggregate (although  automobile inventories de- 
clined more).  The stock-adjustment model does fairly well here, while 
the S, s model misses by about one standard error. 
In September 1979 there was another positive sales surprise according 
to my model, and inventory decumulation was severe. In fact, virtually 
all of this astonishingly large inventory disinvestment ($15.1  billion at an 
annual rate) was done by automobile dealers, and the equations do not 
predict this behavior at all. Sales then dropped sharply in October and 
inventories accumulated-suggesting  involuntary inventory investment. 
None of the models captures this behavior. 
The most stunning and, from the point of view of the 1980 recession, 
most significant behavior occurred in December 1979 and January 1980. 
In December, although sales were strong and fairly well predicted, inven- 
tories were drawn down at an astounding rate ($15.8  billion at annual 
rates).  A  good  deal of  this disinvestment, once  again, came  from the 
automobile industry. The equations do not capture this liquidation well; 
residuals are over two standard errors. Then, in January 1980, sales shot 
upward rapidly and, according to the model, unexpectedly. The rate of 
inventory decumulation in January exceeds the rate of unexpected sales, 
which suggests involuntary disinvestment. The S, s models do reasonably 
well  in predicting this  disinvestment, but  the  stock-adjustment model 
misses it entirely. 
Then sales went sour after February 1980,  and the recession was on. 
According to the model, the declines in sales in February, March, and 
April were mostly unexpected. And casual observation of what went on 
during this time buttresses this view.  (Recall  that the Federal Reserve 
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spin.) Despite this, retailers managed to trim inventories in February and 
March and accumulated only in April. The S, s model predicts this be- 
havior better than the stock-adjustment model, but none does very well. 
Thus retailers appear to have shed inventories rapidly both in Decem- 
ber 1979 (for reasons that are unclear) and in January 1980, mostly be- 
cause sales spurted ahead unexpectedly. As a consequence, they entered 
the recession with very low stocks. In addition, they were able to trim in- 
ventories further in February and March-which  they wanted to do, ac- 
cording to the S, s model-even  though sales were collapsing. Thus, when 
final sales bottomed  out in May  1980,  retailers were not  loaded  with 
excess inventories, and so the painful inventory liquidation that normally 
prolongs and deepens recessions did not have to take place. 
What features of this episode, then, were predictable from the models 
and what features are unexplained? One largely unexplained phenomenon 
is the high rate of stock building from April to July 1979, and especially 
in July. It may well have been a mistake that retailers rectified with rapid 
inventory decumulation in September. 
But the main event in table 19 is surely the huge inventory liquidation 
in December  1979  and January 1980.  Less than a third of this is pre- 
dicted by the S, s model; almost none is predicted by the stock-adjustment 
model; and the rest is unexplained. Whatever its cause, this period of 
rapid inventory liquidation left retailers with lean stocks at the onset of 
the recession. In sum, the sharp drop in inventories in December  1979 
and January 1980  (mostly automobiles),  which was caused in part by a 
spurt in sales, may have prevented the  1980  recession from rivaling or 
even surpassing the 1973-75  recession. 
A Summing Up 
Inventory fluctuations are important in business cycles; indeed, to  a 
great extent, business cycles  are inventory fluctuations. A  surprisingly 
large fraction of the variability of aggregate inventory investment comes 
from the retail sector; little  comes  from manufacturers' inventories of 
finished goods. 
But retail inventory investment has received little empirical and theo- 
retical attention. The empirical work that has been done on retail inven- 
tory behavior has  generally  adopted  the  stock-adjustment model  that Alan S. Blinder  501 
Michael Lovell designed for explaining manufacturing inventories. How- 
ever well  this model  does  in  explaining manufacturers' inventories,  it 
seems unsuited to retailing both on theoretical grounds (why should re- 
tailers want to smooth deliveries?)  and on empirical grounds (the esti- 
mates do not make sense). 
There is a workable alternative-the  S, s model-which  has a long and 
venerable history in the operations research literature, and which is al- 
legedly  in common  use  in  industry today.  The  difficulties of  deriving 
aggregate implications from a model in which inventory behavior is so 
discontinuous, and the complex  dynamics that the S, s  model  implies, 
pose barriers to empirical implementation of the theory. This paper offers 
one way to overcome these barriers. 
The empirical model described here as a representation of  the S,  s 
theory-equations  23 and 24-may  not be the only one possible, but it 
is  a beginning. When it is  applied to  the  data, most  of  the  estimated 
parameters are consistent with the implications of the theory. 
The estimates presented in tables 15 and 16 offer an alternative inter- 
pretation of the anomalous results obtained with stock-adjustment models 
that suggests far faster speeds of adjustment; they do not offer much sup- 
port for the view that inventory investment is highly sensitive to the cost 
of capital; and they indicate a rather low sensitivity of S and s to current 
sales, whether expected or unexpected.46 
APPENDIX  A 
Comparative  Statics  of the Analytical  Model 
THE  EXPRESSION for aggregate deliveries, equation 11 in the text, is re- 
peated here for convenience: 
Y=  (S-  s)F(s, y) +  f_  F(Q, y) dQ, 
46.  An open question is whether the estimated sensitivity of S and s to sales is 
too small from the point of view of the theory. This cannot be addressed  until there 
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where the vector of parameters y has been added because some of these 
parameters affect the distribution function F(Q). 
The first comparative statics experiment considered in the text was a 
uniform rightward  shift of the distribution of sales by Yi units (an increase 
in demand). Since Q =  N -  X, such a change would shift the distribution 
function of Qt uniformly to the left by Yi units, that is, from F(Q,  0)  to 
F(Q,  Yi)  =  F(Q  +  Yi, 0).  Thus for an infinitesimal move of yl, 
aF(Q,  y1)  ~  ?a) 
a  = f(Q  +  'YO. 
Evaluated around Yi =  0, this is 
WF(Q)_  =F  f(Q). 
Such a shift leaves S, s, and N unchanged and moves X and X1 by one unit. 
Using all this information in taking the derivative of equation 11 leads to 
(A- )  a  (S-  s)f(s)  +  |  f(Q)  dQ  =  (S  -  s)f(s)  +  F(s), 
which is equation 12 in the text. 
Comparative statics experiment 2  in  the  text  considered  a  uniform 
rightward  shift in the distribution of initial inventories, Nt, with no change 
in the distribution of Xt and no change in S or s. 
For convenience, I calibrate the shift parameter Y2 so that dN/dy2  1. 
Since the random variable Qt is the difference between Nt  and Xt,  the 
effect of  72  on F(Q)  is equal and opposite to the effect of yi  on F(Q), 
that is, 
aF(Q)  _aF(Q) 
49-Y2  49-Y 
Using this information in equation 11 leads to 
(A-2)  a-Y  =  -(S  -s)f(s)-F(s)  -(1  +  0), 
which is equation 13 in the text. Alan S. Blinder  503 
The next shift parameter to be considered is 73, which raises S and s 
equally but has no effect on the distributions of either Nt or Xt, and hence 
no effect on f(Q).  It follows directly from equation 11 that 
(A-3)  a-=  (S -  s)f(s) +  F(s) =-  1 +  0, 
which  is  equation  14  in  the  text.  Equations  15  and  15a  are derived 
similarly. 
APPENDIX  B 
Derivation  of the Estimating  Equations 
THE  Ut  can be eliminated from equation 18 as follows. Solve equation 19 
for ut and take the difference forward to obtain ut,  -ut.  Then use the 
accounting  identity  to  replace  Nt+1 -  Nt  by  Yt  -  =  yt-  X-Xu 
and simplify. The result is: 
(B-1)  (1 +  OL)ut+l =  -bXe+1  +  (K1 -  1 +  b)Xe +  (K2-  -)Xtz 
+  (K3 -  1)zt +  Et, 
where L is the lag operator and zt  =  qt+l  -  t.  This is the exact definition 
of ut. 
Next subtract Xt from both sides of equation 18 to obtain 
Yt-  Xt  =  (K1  -  1)Xt +  (K2-  1)Xt -  (1 +  O)ut +  K3zt +  Et, 
and apply the operator (1  +  OL) to both sides of this equation. After 
some algebraic manipulations, this yields 
/ANt =  -06ANt_1 +  [K1 -  1 +  b(1  +  0)] (Xt  -  Xet1) 
?  (K2 -  1) (Xu -  X8 1) +  K3(zt  - 
Zt-1) 
+  (1 +  0) zt_1 +  Et -  st-1. 504  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  2:1981 
Application of the assumptions of model 0 and model 1 gives equations 
23 and 24, respectively, in the text. 
APPENDIX  C 
Manufacturers'  Price Indexes 
ONE  VARIABLE used in the regressions is the ratio of the retailers' buying 
price  (the  manufacturers' selling  price)  to  the  retailers' selling  price. 
Retail sales price indexes are available for each of the sectors  (unpub- 
lished data from the Bureau of  Economic  Analysis),  but there are no 
data on buying prices. 
I attempted to match each retail sector with a corresponding producer 
price subindex designed to represent the buying price of that sector as 
follows: 
Retail sector  Manufacturing  sector, producer price index 
All retailing  Finished  consumer  goods 
Durables 
Automobiles  Passenger  cars 
Furniture  and appliances  Furniture  and  household  durables 
Lumber  and hardware  Lumber  and  wood products 
Other  durables  Finished  consumer  durables 
Nondurables 
Food  Processed  foods and  feeds 
Apparel  Textile  products  and  apparel 
General  merchandise  Consumer  nondurable  finished 
goods (other than  food) 
Other  nondurables  Consumer  nondurable  finished 
goods (other  than  food) 
In most cases the match is quite good.  One minor problem is that the 
producer price  subindex  matched  to  "other durables" is  actually  the 
price index appropriate to all  durables; it does not remove the prices of 
automobiles,  furniture and  appliances,  and  lumber  and  hardware. A 
similar problem is that the index matched to "other nondurables" fails 
to remove the prices of apparel and general merchandise items. 
There is, however, one problem that is much more serious. The pro- Alan S. Blinder  505 
ducer price  index  matched  to  the  general  merchandise  sector-non- 
durable finished goods excluding food-includes  energy prices and hence 
must have little resemblance to the prices actually paid by department 
stores in the post-OPEC period. There is no easy solution to this prob- 
lem. I tried to create a synthetic index by using this index for the pre- 
OPEC period and using the index for consumer finished goods excluding 
food  and energy  (but  including durables)  for  the post-OPEC  period. 
But this variable performed very poorly in the regressions. Comments 
and  Discussion 
Michael C. Lovell:  Alan Blinder's paper constitutes a most useful contri- 
bution to the understanding of how fluctuations in retail inventories in- 
fluence the business cycle. The primary innovation involves his attack on 
the difficult task of applying the S, s  ("two-bin" or "optimal lot size") 
operations research inventory model pioneered by T. M. Whitin to the 
econometric study of inventory fluctuations over the course of the busi- 
ness cycle.1 This is not an easy task; I want to stress at the outset that 
the S, s approach Blinder is taking is one that many economists have shied 
away from because it seemed intractable. 
Blinder begins with a description of the substantial contribution that 
fluctuations in inventory investment make to cyclical reversals in the pace 
of economic activity. His results, for the most part, verify with recent data 
points made long ago by Abramovitz and Stanback about the large swings 
in inventory investment that take place in the typical business cycle.2 The 
fact is well known and suggests that the invisible hand that allocates re- 
search activity among competing topics, at least until very recently, pro- 
vided too little support for the study of inventory cycles. 
Blinder's strategy in demonstrating the fundamental role of inventories 
in the business cycle is to compare the variance of inventories about trend 
with that of other GNP components about their trend, taking covariances 
appropriately into account. A possible limitation of this strategy is that, 
while seasonal movements and trend have been eliminated, the irregular 
1.  Thomson  M.  Whitin,  The  Theory  of  Intventory Management  (Princeton  Uni- 
versity Press,  1953). 
2.  Moses  Abramovitz,  Inventories  and  Business  Cycles  (National  Bureau  of 
Economic  Research,  1950);  and Thomas  M. Stanback,  Jr., Postwar  Cycles  in Manui- 
facturers' Inventories  (National  Bureau of Economic  Research,  1962). 
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and cyclical movements are confounded; the variances and covariances 
reported in his tables do not confirm that the fluctuations are occurring at 
cyclical frequencies. My feeling is that a more revealing strategy, pio- 
neered by Klein and Popkin twenty years ago, is to  show with econo- 
metric model simulations how the economy would have behaved if inven- 
tories were stable.3 But although the analytic technique used by Blinder 
may be flawed, there is no questioning the fact that fluctuations in inven- 
tory investment normally play a large part in the typical business cycle 
downturn. 
The latest recession appears as a possible exception to the classic pat- 
tern of inventory behavior. This is no surprise because there is a recurrent 
tendency  as each recession passes  for  the preliminary data to  suggest 
exceptional behavior. It is also usual in a recession for at least one busi- 
ness analyst to remark that the deviations from past cyclical patterns of 
inventory behavior result from the adoption of scientific inventory man- 
agement techniques and improved computer control. Blinder found such 
remarks in Fortune; unfortunately, there is no  obvious  source of hard 
data with which to measure the spread of  scientific inventory manage- 
ment. The surprise Blinder emphasizes is the fact that inventory invest- 
ment was up in  1980:2.  This was  an upward movement  in which  the 
two preceding quarters and the following quarters were characterized by 
substantial decumulation; real inventory disinvestment took place at an 
annual rate of $5 billion during the third quarter of  1980, which marks 
the bottom of  the National  Bureau of  Economic  Research's reference 
cycle; inventory investment was negative for the year. The most unusual 
feature of this downturn is that it was so widely anticipated; indeed, the 
chairman of the Federal Reserve Board said the recession was half over 
before the cycle peaked! And the Federal Reserve imposed credit con- 
trols shortly after the recession finally materialized. From the preliminary 
evidence now available I do not think it is possible to determine whether 
the extremely short downturn was due to the atypical behavior of inven- 
tories, whether the extremely short nature of  the downturn caused in- 
ventories to behave strangely, or whether the apparent abnormality of 
3.  Lawrence  R. Klein and Joel Popkin,  "An Econometric  Analysis  of the Postwar 
Relationship  between  Inventory  Fluctuations  and Changes  in Aggregate  Economic 
Activity,"  in  Joint  Economic  Committee,  Inventory  Fluctuations  and  Economic 
Stabilization,  87  Cong.  1  sess.  (U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1961),  pt.  3, 
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behavior-the  upward movement in the second quarter-was  due to mea- 
surement error.4 
I now turn to the heart of the paper, Blinder's application of the S, s 
inventory model of  operations research fame to the task of  explaining 
aggregate inventory behavior. This is a most useful contribution, and I 
suspect that Blinder's approach may well find future applications in the 
area of manufacturing inventory as well as retail trade. In many manu- 
facturing enterprises machine setup costs induce manufacturers to make 
extended runs of  each  different type  of  item they  produce; the  same 
square-root linkage between  carrying costs  and sales  and the  optimal 
order points applies to the determination of  optimal lot  size in manu- 
facturing. 
Both the pluses and minuses must be considered in comparing the S, s 
approach with  the  rival  behavior  generated  by  certainty-equivalence 
linear  decision  rules  derived from  quadratic cost  functions  by  Holt, 
Modigliani, Muth, and Simon.5 An advantage of linear decision rules is 
that they are linear, facilitating both their aggregation and their estima- 
tion in econometric applications. One disadvantage is that they are insuffi- 
ciently restrictive; instead of yielding tight a priori restrictions limiting 
the range of admissible types of behavior that must be considered by the 
econometrician, this strategy can be used to justify a very wide variety of 
models as being compatible with the assumption of profit maximization. 
A second disadvantage of a linear decision rule is that although it can be 
used, once derived, to calculate on the back of an envelope the appro- 
priate level of output, a painful recalculation of the rule is required to 
take changes in carrying costs  (such as interest rates)  properly into ac- 
count. This makes it difficult for the econometrician using linear decision 
rules to model the effect of tight interest rates; it may also mean that busi- 
ness enterprises using linear decision rules will be  slow  to  respond to 
interest rate changes because they will be reluctant to call in their con- 
sultants to do the z-transform calculations necessary to rederive the de- 
4.  Judging by past experience, GNP data are subject to sharp revisions. For ex- 
ample, the earliest published figures suggested that the 1958 recession involved a 
drop in GNP of  $2.6 billion; successive revisions changed this figure to -$0.800, 
+$1.455,  +$1.777,  +$6.200,  and +$6.126  billion. Quarterly data and figures on 
inventory  investment (involving the differencing  of observations  of stocks) are sub- 
ject to greater  measurement  error. 
5.  Charles  C. Holt  and others,  Planning  Production,  Inventories  and Work Force 
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cision rule. Further, the linear decision rule model does not tolerate the 
imposition of sign-constraints-for  example, the restriction that stocks 
cannot be negative. 
An advantage of the S, s inventory rule is that it is rather easy to re- 
calculate the trigger points  in response to  changes in sales  volume  or 
carrying costs. The S, s firms are likely to be more responsive to interest 
rate changes. On the other hand, price adjustments are another story. 
Although it is reasonable for firms to reduce their customary markups 
when faced with exceptionally  high inventory holdings,  such behavior 
cannot be modeled within the S, s framework with the same ease with 
which it can be added to the production smoothing model developed by 
Holt, Modigliani, Muth, and Simon. Indeed, an S, s rule probably is not 
optimal once sales price is introduced as an additional decision variable. 
The major disadvantage of S, s  decision rules is that aggregation is 
extremely difficult. Higher levels  of  management may be  reluctant to 
adopt S, s policies for individual product lines because it is difficult to 
determine their combined cash-flow implications. Further, it is conceiv- 
able that optimizing inventories on each product might lead to larger total 
inventories, leading company treasurers to reject the rules. The aggrega- 
tion problem creates major difficulties for the econometrician interested 
in  the industry-wide implications  of  S,  s  inventory behavior; and the 
problem is  confounded  by  the  rich variety of  responses  that may  be 
generated. For example, some firms may be inhibited by limited storage 
capacity from enlarging stocks in response to an increase in sales volume; 
this constraint has kept my neighborhood gasoline station from adjusting 
S since long before OPEC. Some firms, at least in the longer run, may 
respond optimally by enlarging stocks in proportion to the square root of 
sales volume; in the still longer run, firms may respond to growing sales 
by introducing new product lines or adding new retail outlets, in which 
case stocks will expand in proportion to the growth in sales volume. 
Blinder focuses upon two types of S, s model response. In model 1 all 
firms in the industry respond to environmental changes by adjusting both 
S and s equally; in the simplest case, this means that the optimal order 
quantity remains constant while the safety stock changes. In model 0 the 
order quantity changes but the safety stock is fixed. These two models are 
marked simplifications of the many variations of the S, s theme discussed 
in the management science literature. Some S, s firms may continuously 
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lower trigger point; others monitor at regular intervals, in which case the 
frequency of monitoring may be a decision variable. Nevertheless, I do 
not believe that Blinder should be faulted for his simplifications, which 
are obviously unavoidable because no model providing a framework for 
empirical study can attempt to  capture the full  detail  of  the  complex 
phenomenon he is studying. 
Blinder approaches the aggregation problem by evaluating simple sim- 
ulation experiments based on four and sixteen single-product firms, each 
individually pursuing an S, s inventory policy. My judgment is that Blinder 
does not go nearly far enough; a more elaborate research strategy is re- 
quired. Artificial aggregate time series could be derived on the computer 
by summing data obtained from simulations run on 50 or 100 firms in a 
controlled experimental environment involving both demand shocks and 
shifting interest rates. Then Blinder could test his estimation strategy by 
determining how well it enabled an econometrician to recover the under- 
lying firm parameters from  the  artificial aggregate time  series.6 As  it 
stands, Blinder's simple numerical calculations are suggestive, but I be- 
lieve subsequent research must determine whether he has succeeded in 
accurately capturing the implications for the aggregates of the S, s inven- 
tory behavior he postulates at the level of the individual firm. 
Blinder's empirical tests contrast his S, s model with the behavior of 
a naive buffer stock model of retail inventory behavior. The results for 
the two models are remarkably close in terms of goodness of fit, as mea- 
sured by the standard error of the estimate. A major disappointment is 
that neither model provides any evidence for concluding that changes in 
interest rates or credit crunches have an impact on inventory investments, 
but as one of many researchers who has been similarly disappointed, I 
cannot cast stones at this nonresult. 
My own view of the relative merits of the two models considered by 
Blinder is prejudiced by my own efforts in the area. I am unhappy with 
both. My worry with the buffer stock model does not arise primarily from 
the frequently voiced concern about slow speeds of adjustment. Effecting 
changes in inventory targets is likely to involve a delayed response in part 
because time may be required to do the arithmetic of changing S, s trigger 
points or in applying the z-transform to rederive linear decision rules. A 
6. This is the essence of the strategy  employed in a pioneering study of inventory 
behavior  by  Edwin  S.  Mills,  Price,  Output,  and  Inventtory Policy,  a  Study  in  the 
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physical adjustment of storage capacity may be required-retail  gasoline 
is an extreme example in which it is unlikely to pay the gasoline station to 
adjust storage capacity during the lifespan of the facility. For many retail 
stores, inventory consists  of  items with  sharp seasonal  fluctuations in 
demand. At  the end of  the  summer the department store or discount 
house with sizable stocks of patio furniture is likely to have to carry over 
its inventory until next spring; that stock cannot be sold between Labor 
Day  and Memorial Day.  Retail  outlets  stocking hundreds of  different 
items are likely to suffer from serious inventory imbalances-too  many 
of last season's goods  and not enough to  meet current demands. Such 
imbalances cannot be rapidly adjusted except through distress sales, and 
these are ruled out by models that assume the retail price is exogenous, 
such as the S, s model of optimal inventory behavior and Blinder's study, 
which treats the retailer's markup as exogenous. I think that the strategy 
pioneered by Modigliani and Sauerlender in their study of cement inven- 
tories could be fruitfully applied to retail trade. They allowed the speed 
of adjustment to become more rapid as the firm approached the end of 
the sales season.7 
It seems to me that the speed of adjustment for inventories should be 
considerably slower than that for liquid assets; yet when the lagged stock 
of  money  is included in money  demand equations,  it  generally  has  a 
rather large coefficient; for example, Steve Goldfeld  obtains an adjust- 
ment speed of 25 percent per quarter for quarterly data on the demand 
for Ml,  which provides good company for the slow speeds of adjustment 
of many buffer stock inventory models.8 As is well known, lagged adjust- 
ment coefficients are subject to estimation bias. Some buffer stock models 
that include more refined specifications have yielded very fast adjustment 
speeds. Thus F. Owen Irvine, Jr., achieves an adjustment speed of 25 per- 
cent a month in recently published regressions on automobile inventories.9 
In my judgment both the buffer stock and the S, s models tested in 
Blinder's paper share a common  defect because they neglect  a funda- 
7.  Franco Modigliani and Owen H. Sauerlender,  "Economic Expectations and 
Plans of  Firms in Relation to  Short-Term Forecasting," in National Bureau of 
Economic  Research,  Short-Term  Economic  Forecasting,  Studies  in  Income  and 
Wealth, vol. 17 (Princeton University Press, 1955). 
8. Stephen M. Goldfeld, "The Case of the Missing Money," BPEA, 3:1976, p. 
686. 
9.  F. Owen Irvine, Jr., "A Study of  Automobile Inventory Investment," Eco- 
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mental point emphasized by Ruth Mack in much of her research: retailers 
must order seasonal merchandise long in advance of  the sales season. 
They worry about Christmas in July; and the precise timing of deliveries 
is largely at the mercy of the manufacturer and the transportation net- 
work. Thus, Mack argues, the primary control variable to be watched by 
management is  "ownership position," the sum of  inventories on  hand 
plus orders for merchandise yet to be delivered.10  Cyert and March pro- 
vide support for Mack's position, pointing out that when advance orders 
are placed to cover only a fraction of the sales anticipated for the sales 
season, reordering on a rush delivery basis may involve a price penalty or 
the possibility that the item will never arrive, but the hope prevails that 
reordering can be tailored on an item-by-item basis, making use of sales 
experience early in the sales season.11  My own research on retail inven- 
tories, based on individual department store stock and order data as well 
as aggregates, supports this approach.12 
A second problem is in the selection of proxies for anticipated sales. 
The one Blinder uses is based on an estimated demand equation incor- 
porating the firm's relative price markup; this is  inconsistent with his 
derivation of  the S,  s  policy  rule,  which  assumes that the  markup is 
exogenous to the firm. I believe that there are several promising expecta- 
tions  alternatives that deserve Blinder's attention. One is  to  note  that 
retailers, because  they  do  not  have  much skill  in  estimating seasonal 
movements,  often  resort  to  "same-period-last-year" forecasting;  with 
monthly data, this suggests that sales lagged twelve periods may be  an 
important component of anticipated sales. The second alternative is based 
on the extensive empirical evidence that sales forecasts are not  fully ra- 
tional; at least in manufacturing, firms do not  adequately make use of 
their last period's sales in forecasting for next quarter;  thus it is fruitful to 
proxy expected sales, Xl', by a mixture of last period's sales and actual 
developments: 
XI'  =  XXt +  (1  -)Xt-l; 
10. Ruth P. Mack, "Changes in Ownership of  Purchased Materials," in Joint 
Economic  Committee,  Inventory  Fluctuations  and  Economic  Stabilization,  87 
Cong. 1 sess. (GPO, 1961), pt. 2, pp. 59-87. 
11.  Richard  M.  Cyert  and  James  G.  March,  A  Behavioral  Theory  of  the  Firm 
(Prentice  Hall, 1963). 
12. Michael C.  Lovell,  "Department Store Inventory, Sales, Order Relation- 
ships," in James S. Duesenberry  and others, eds., The Brookings Model: Some Fur- 
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the evidence is that X lies far from the value of unity implied by the ra- 
tional expectations assumption.13  Further, it might be useful to consider 
explicitly the span of future sales over several months in order to encom- 
pass the full sales season. 
In conclusion, while it should be no surprise to anyone that Lovell is 
still prejudiced in favor of the strategies applied in earlier research, I do 
want to emphasize that if I do not completely accept the innovative appli- 
cation of the S, s model that Blinder presents, I am convinced that his 
paper constitutes a most innovative contribution that will spark a number 
of follow-up investigations in the years ahead. 
Lawrence H.  Summers: Alan  Blinder's paper makes a significant con- 
tribution to the literature on inventories. Rather than fiddling with tried 
and untrue specifications drawn from earlier work, he steps back and re- 
thinks the  underlying economics.  The  paper  sets  forth  an  alternative 
theory of aggregate inventory behavior that, it is argued, is superior in 
both the realism of its microeconomic foundations and its ability to ex- 
plain macroeconomic fluctuations. Blinder's paper is  exceptional  in its 
careful attention to aggregation issues and thorough efforts to verify the 
robustness of  conclusions.  It is  refreshing to  see  a piece  of  empirical 
macroeconomics that so clearly has the truth, rather than the technique, 
as its objective. 
Blinder makes an overwhelming case for inventory investment as an 
important component of business cycle fluctuations. However, he is much 
less persuasive about the importance of retail inventories. The disaggrega- 
tion of  manufacturing inventories  into  three components  ensures that 
much of  their variation will  be  relegated to  the  "all other covariance 
terms" category. Similarly, this procedure will understate the relative im- 
portance of manufacturing  finished goods. More fundamentally, I wonder 
about the meaning of the category "retail inventory." Finished goods are 
stored between the time they are finished and the time they are consumed. 
It is of relatively little economic significance whether the appliance that 
will someday be mine today sits in a wholesaler's warehouse or a retail 
store's showroom. 
This point is exemplified by the automobile industry, which accounts 
for most of the variance in retail inventories. Is it of economic significance 
13.  Albert  A.  Hirsch  and Michael  C. Lovell,  Sales  Anticipations  and  Inventory 
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whether gas guzzlers are located in Dearborn or on dealers' lots? As many 
dealers can ruefully attest, retail inventories do not reflect retailer choices. 
To the extent that automobile inventories play an important role in busi- 
ness cycle fluctuations, one wonders which way the causality runs. 
The paper discusses alternative theories of inventory behavior. Blinder's 
skepticism about the production-smoothing model as an empirically rel- 
evant tale about business cycles seems well warranted.  Is not the following 
an acid test? If production-smoothing were the dominant consideration in 
cyclical inventory fluctuations, then one would see inventory buildups at 
cycle troughs and liquidation at peaks. The opposite is the case, however. 
The observation that production is more variable than sales is simply a 
more quantitative restatement of the same point. My doubts about the 
economic meaning of the inventory categories make me skeptical about 
the previous empirical tests of this model Blinder cites, which study only 
finished goods inventories in manufacturing. Manufacturers presumably 
induce retailers to buffer manufacturing  inventory fluctuations by offering 
them price reductions. 
Blinder then turns to an examination of the implications of his favorite 
theory, the S, s model for aggregate economic behavior. Although the S, s 
model is to operations research what the Phillips curve once was to eco- 
nomics, its macroeconomic consequences, to my knowledge, have never 
been studied. I have three major reservations about Blinder's otherwise 
excellent treatment. First, virtually all retailers sell  a large number of 
goods obtained from a much smaller number of suppliers. The economies 
of scale to which Blinder refers, such as the fact that empty trucks are 
costly, are overcome by having large orders even if they are for several 
different goods. Order points for any given good should depend on avail- 
able inventories of all goods. No reorder point can be fixed for one good 
independently. And it cannot be assumed that the S, s model is applicable 
en masse to appropriate groups of goods. There is a major problem when 
one good  is in short supply but other goods  are not.  This problem of 
aggregation across goods strikes me as being as important as the aggrega- 
tion over firms to which Blinder devotes much more attention. 
Second, Blinder tells a partial equilibrium tale in which a large number 
of prices are held fixed. As a model for analyzing the inventory decisions 
of a department store's inventory, the S, s model can easily be rationalized. 
I doubt that it can be justified as a story about aggregate fluctuations, or 
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dealing with many retailers. If the economy takes a downward turn and all 
retailers foresee a prolonged shortfall in sales, demand for deliveries will 
respond sharply. Blinder's simulations provide  an idea of  what would 
occur. Deliveries would become very erratic. In Blinder's simplified ex- 
ample, the standard deviation of deliveries actually exceeds their mean. 
This would impose huge burdens in terms of either production variability 
or fluctuating inventories on suppliers. Presumably they would respond 
by changing prices in an effort to achieve a smoother production path. 
These changes in prices would introduce intertemporal substitution effects 
of a type not captured by the S, s model. Firms would order early or delay 
slightly beyond the point suggested by the S, s model in order to purchase 
at the time when goods were relatively cheap. The assumption that Blinder 
makes-that  these sorts of effects do not exist in short-run business cycle 
fluctuations-is  inconsistent with the theory. If the S, s model is really 
an accurate representation, fluctuating deliveries must necessarily give 
rise to this sort of response. 
There is another way to look  at this. Without specifying the details, 
micro theory allows us to assert that a competitive economy will mini- 
mize costs. Producers and retailers will reach the equilibrium that mini- 
mizes the sum of production, inventory holding, and inventory ordering 
costs. It does not matter whether or not producers own their retail out- 
lets, the strategy that minimizes joint costs will be adopted. This result 
does not rest on  any assumed cooperation between producers and re- 
tailers. Rather, it is grounded in the logic of profit maximization. Suppose 
a policy were followed  that led to different marginal cost  of inventory 
holding for producers and retailers. The producer would find profits in- 
creased by adjusting the price to the retailer until the point at which the 
equal marginal costs condition was met. This argument does not depend 
on the assumption of perfect competition in either producer market or in 
retailing. Similar arguments are standard in industrial organization, where 
they are invoked to demonstrate that even in situations of imperfect com- 
petition, there is no loss in efficiency from certain types of vertical ar- 
rangements. The details of a joint cost minimization strategy are difficult 
to articulate. In general, they depend on the magnitude of  adjustment 
costs in production, on shipment costs, and on the relative costs of inven- 
tory holding by producers and retailers. But two negative conclusions are 
clear. First, the proper unit of preliminary analysis is total inventories, not 
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orders actually observed need not be anything like that predicted by the 
S.,  s model with the false assumption of constant supplier prices. 
The point here is the familiar fallacy of conmposition.  Macroeconomic 
behavior is not fruitfully analyzed as the sum of the microeconomic be- 
havior of each individual, with everything else held constant. I  should 
emphasize that the fallacy of composition described here applies to all 
macroeconomic studies of inventory behavior that focus on only one type 
of market participant. It seems to me that the appropriate unit of analysis 
is  aggregate inventories, rather than those  held  only  by producers or 
retailers. 
A third difficulty  with the model Blinder employs is that it assumes that 
firms have no control over their sales, which they take as given, and that 
they expect to face a constant real price from suppliers. Anyone who has 
waited to buy a down jacket in May, a Christmas gift in January, or an 
old model car in September recognizes that retail inventories affect retail 
prices and sales. High department store markups further indicate the in- 
elasticity of at least some retail demand. Even apart from the considera- 
tions just discussed, it is not reasonable to assume that real acquisition 
prices  are constant.  The  tendency  for  prices to  ratchet intermittently 
rather than rise continuously, which Blinder discusses, implies substantial 
gains to firms scheduling orders prudently. 
These are not just quibbles. They are important channels of response 
to demand shocks in the form of changes in prices on the part of both sup- 
pliers and producers that need to be considered if inventory behavior is 
to be understood. Note that Blinder's finding that cost-of-capital effects 
are of no consequence is not relevant here. His analysis of the effects of 
interest rate changes is based on permanent changes that affect a firm's 
target range for inventories. The argument stressed here focuses on short- 
run intertemporal substitution effects. 
Given these theoretical difficulties, it is surprising that Blinder's em- 
pirical work turns out as well as it does. There are, however, several diffi- 
culties that should lead to caution in interpreting  the results. First, Blinder 
uses seasonally adjusted data in all his regressions. Although I recognize 
the difficulties and costs of doing otherwise, I believe this is a mistake. 
Firms order when actual inventories are low,  not when seasonally  ad- 
justed inventories are below  some norm. They respond to  sales rather 
than to deviations between sales and a seasonal norm. The theory is clearly 
couched in terms of actual levels, not seasonally adjusted levels. I cannot Alan S. Blinder  517 
see any reason to expect the model to fit data smoothed by seasonal ad- 
justment. There is another point here: I disagree with Blinder's judgment 
that inventory fluctuations that are purely seasonal  are uninteresting. 
Their very regularity and size mean that they offer the best hope to identify 
the technological parameters that help to determine business cycle fluc- 
tuations. 
Second, there are difficulties in Blinder's measurement of the cost of 
capital. In Blinder's formulation, the short-term interest rate enters into 
the determination of y. This is puzzling. The S and s should be set on the 
basis of long-run considerations rather than the very short interest rate 
that Blinder studies. 
Third, there are potentially severe econometric problems with the re- 
sults. Blinder notes the absence of serial correlation in his equations. This 
may well be the result of the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable. In 
the presence of a lagged dependent variable, conventional tests for serial 
correlation do not apply. Serial correlation leads to inconsistent, rather 
than merely inefficient, estimates. Moreover, there is every reason to ex- 
pect  complex  moving-average  errors given  the  sort  of  manipulations 
Blinder goes through to develop the estimating equation. Tests for first- 
order autoregressive serial correlation seem insufficient. Moreover, it is 
questionable whether sales are really exogenous in an equation of this 
kind. The price effects I have just described, along with the "inventory 
cycle effects" that Blinder discusses, make this premise seem unlikely. 
Despite these doubts, I believe this paper breaks important new ground. 
It  suggests alternative formulations  to  the  standard stock  adjustment 
model of inventory behavior. And it goes a long way toward developing 
the implications of one plausible alternative, the S, s model. It is clear that 
more useful research can be done within this framework. Such research 
will start with Blinder's important contribution. 
General Discussion 
Most of the discussants agreed with Blinder that further study of inven- 
tory behavior was worthwhile. Charles Holt  lamented the lack of com- 
munication among economists, management scientists, and industrial en- 
gineers and observed that the management science literature had long 
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inventories. A number of discussants raised questions about the plausibil- 
ity of Blinder's model. Several agreed with Summers that the S, s model 
was not appropriate  for the retail automobile sector that dominated retail 
inventory behavior. Holt suggested that since automobile inventories are 
largely controlled by manufacturers rather than retailers, another inven- 
tory model is needed that pays more attention to  the relation between 
firms at different stages of  production. Robert Gordon added that the 
average size of  a delivery-probably  six to  eight cars per truckload- 
is much smaller than a retailer's typical monthly sales. For this reason it 
seemed unreasonable to believe the sawtooth pattern of inventory hold- 
ings implicit in the S, s model. He questioned the relevance of a theory 
that does not apply to a major fraction of retail inventory fluctuations. 
Gordon also pointed out that, in sectors such as retail furniture, firms only 
make decisions regarding orders once or twice a year, and actual fluctua- 
tions in inventories after that are largely determined by sales and manu- 
facturers' delivery schedules. Thus the timing of inventory fluctuations is 
not tightly tied to retailers' decisions. 
Several discussants found the S, s theory unrealistic in assuming that 
the retail price is outside the control of retailers. Stephen Goldfeld noted 
that price reductions are frequently used by retailers to adjust excess in- 
ventories. F.  Thomas Juster added that,  although price  adjustment is 
probably unimportant in sectors such as food retailing, in others such as 
general merchandising, retailers simultaneously revise  their price  and 
inventory policies  when  they  notice  their  sales  are not  meeting  sales 
targets. 
Martin Baily defended the production-smoothing model of inventory 
holdings in situations in which sales fluctuations are believed to be short 
term-seasonal  sales fluctuations, for example. In a business cycle peak, 
sales start to fall and firms allow inventories to pile up because they think 
that the sales decline is temporary. Once it becomes clear that there will 
be a prolonged recession, firms cut production and work off excess inven- 
tories because it is too costly to use inventories to smooth production over 
a period as long as the business cycle. The end-of-expansion productivity 
behavior recently described by Robert Gordon is a closely related phe- 
nomenon.'  William Fellner  in turn questioned the  realism of  the S, s 
model. While agreeing that a minimum order size would introduce fluc- 
1. See Robert J. Gordon, "The 'End of Expansion' Phenomenon in Short-Run 
Productivity  Behavior,"  BPEA, 2:1979, pp. 447-61. Alan S. Blinder  519 
tuations in the holdings of small retailers, he did not know the plausible 
reason for  large firms to  have  deliveries that were  sizable  relative to 
monthly sales. 
Discussants offered a variety of comments on the empirical work in the 
paper. Benjamin Friedman argued that the lag structure used by Blinder 
is implausible since it  assumes a nearly instantaneous response by re- 
tailers to inventory excess or shortage and to changes in interest rates and 
prices. Friedman suggested that decisionmakers often  do  not  find out 
about these changes within a month, so it does not seem sensible to as- 
sume that responses to them begin in the initial month. The fact that this 
assumption is usually made when estimating inventory models might ex- 
plain the implausibly slow adjustment speeds found in studies using the 
stock-adjustment model, without any need to invoke the S, s model. 
Goldfeld was skeptical of Blinder's particular specification and inter- 
pretation of the inventory equation in light of Blinder's own simulations 
and rich menu of possible lag structures. He  noted that except for the 
error term, the  estimating equations  look  rather conventional.  If  the 
theory is to be taken seriously, much more attention should be given to 
the time structure of the error term. Holt noted that unfilled orders and 
the lead times required to replenish inventories vary cyclically and thought 
it a mistake to take them as constant in estimation. He also argued that 
the dynamics of aggregate inventory behavior is importantly affected by 
interindustry  structure. In particular, he reported finding in a study of the 
television  industry that this structure leads  to  important amplification 
effects, with small fluctuations in sales at the retail level leading to larger 
fluctuations for wholesalers and even larger fluctuations for manufactur- 
ers. Although production was smoothed, fluctuations of orders to sup- 
pliers were again amplified. Holt also observed that the introduction of 
computers has revolutionized inventory control and suggested that this 
should cause some instability in the coefficients of the inventory model 
through time. 
Christopher Sims questioned whether the estimated equations actually 
constitute an identified structural model of businesses' inventory holding 
behavior. He believed that the equations are more likely simply to reflect 
the  complex  interrelation between  inventories  and  other  endogenous 
variables in the economy. 
Gordon and Sims, while agreeing that there may be other reasons to 
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fluctuations to business cycles. Gordon pointed out that only 61/2 percent 
of deviations of GNP from trend are attributable  to inventory fluctuations, 
and suggested that the main point of business cycle studies is to explain 
these deviations from trend. Sims observed that inventories might be im- 
portant for determining the local timing of cycles, but in his own work 
''surprises" in inventories do not seem to lead to important cumulative 
effects on other macroeconomic variables. Consequently, precise model- 
ing of inventories does not appear particularly important from the point 
of view of forecasting GNP four quarters ahead. William Branson coun- 
tered that, in the current very serious recession in Britain, the entire re- 
duction in GNP seems to be accounted for by inventory decumulation 
according to data in the paper by Buiter and Miller in this issue. Blinder 
suggested that inventory movements provided a major part of the expla- 
nation for normal recessions, but agreed with Gordon that very severe 
recessions  or  depressions-with  the  possible  exception  of  the  recent 
British experience-are  not well explained by inventory behavior. 